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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING CALLS TO DEFUND THE POLICE

During the summer of 2020, the police killings of George Floyd,
Breonna Taylor, and others created a movement that unearthed a
reality that Black people in the United States have always been aware
of: systemic racism, in the form of police brutality, is alive and well.
While the blatant brutality of George Floyd’s murder at the hands of
police is the flame,1 the spark was ignited long ago. One need only
review the record of recent years — the killings of Eric Garner,
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Antwon Rose, Alton Sterling, Philando
Castile, Breonna Taylor, and countless other souls have led to this
particular season of widespread protests and organized demands for

1. See Oliver Holmes, George Floyd Killing Sparks Protests Across US: At a
Guide,
GUARDIAN
(May
30,
2020,
6:58
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/30/george-floyd-protests-latest-at-aglance-white-house [https://perma.cc/FHH5-L93D]. For an understanding of how
George Floyd was killed, see Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in
Police
Custody,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/S8JE-T8E4].
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change. 2 This is a historical moment of tremendous civil unrest,
deemed by many as a revived Civil Rights Movement.3
While various reform-seeking legislative measures have been in
process for the past several years, this particular moment is different
and calls for a different response. Protests and demonstrations erupted
on stages large and small, drawing attention to social justice issues.4
From schools to small businesses to large corporations, institutions
across the country issued statements pledging themselves and their
finances to antiracism work.5 As the focus turns from necessary protest
to tangible progress, what remains unanswered is how best to proceed.
Professor Ibram X. Kendi described antiracism as “a radical choice in
the face of this history, requiring a radical reorientation of our
consciousness.”6 One such “radical choice” is defunding the police.
Police defunding can follow many models, but two have emerged
most prominently among activists and scholars.
Under one,
jurisdictions completely disband entire police departments, offering
leaders the opportunity to begin afresh and draft community-led public
safety prototypes that do not include police at all.7 Under the other,

2. See Alia Chughtai, Know Their Names: Black People Killed by the Police in
AL
JAZEERA
(Oct.
21,
2020),
US,
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/know-their-names/index.html
[https://perma.cc/C5TX-GBNW]; Holmes, supra note 1.
3. See Valerie Strauss, This Is My Generation’s Civil Rights Movement, WASH.
POST
(June
6,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/06/06/this-is-my-generations-civil-ri
ghts-movement/ [https://perma.cc/8BZG-24CS].
4. See, e.g., Marc J. Spears, ‘Black Lives Matter, People’: How the NBA’s Social
Justice Efforts Dominated the Season, UNDEFEATED (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://theundefeated.com/features/how-the-nba-social-justice-efforts-dominated-theseason/ [https://perma.cc/W3QG-FAL3].
5. For a list of large businesses making such pledges, see Nivedita Balu &
Aishwarya Venugopal, Factbox: Corporations Pledge $1.7 Billion to Address Racism,
REUTERS
(June
9,
2020,
9:48
PM),
Injustice,
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-minneapolis-police-pledges-factbox/factbox-corpo
rations-pledge-1-7-billion-to-address-racism-injustice-idUKKBN23H06S
[https://perma.cc/SE77-KG65]. For an example of what educational institutions are
doing, see Law Deans Anti-Racism Clearinghouse Project, ASS’N AM. L. SCHS.,
https://www.aals.org/antiracist-clearinghouse/ [https://perma.cc/T8PL-7FAU] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2021).
6. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 23 (2019).
7. See Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. Here’s What
It
Means,
CNN
(June
17,
2020,
10:32
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D43B-ECVX]; Dionne Searcey, What Would Efforts to Defund or
Disband Police Departments Really Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/what-does-defund-police-mean.html
[https://perma.cc/HR6J-JWNU].
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police departments’ coffers are divested, to varying degrees, and funds
are reallocated to various social services to reduce, but not wholly
eliminate, police contact with the community.8 While different, these
models have been described as analogous, as both seek to shift sole
responsibility for public safety away from police departments.9
Regardless of the ultimate design, the fundamental idea behind
defunding the police is that the United States’ system of policing is
systemically racist and eradicating that racism requires dismantling.
Diversion of police funding, which is often the most expensive line item
of large cities’ budgets,10 would shift focus “away from surveillance and
punishment, and toward fostering equitable, healthy, and safe
communities.”11 Funding would instead be diverted to, among other
things, strengthen crisis care capacity and hire and train social service
workers, with the hope of decreasing negative interactions with police
and bettering community relations.12 In essence, the modern call to
defund the police is actually “a call to reinvent our criminal justice
system to better honor our national pledge of equal justice under the
law.”13
While there has been increased support for police reform and
recognition of systemic racism throughout the country, the particular
call to defund the police has created considerable controversy and has
not reached widespread consensus.14 Although the long-held belief in
police “super powers” is crumbling,15 the majority of Americans do not

8. See Andrew, supra note 7; Searcey, supra note 7.
9. See Andrew, supra note 7.
10. See Carl Sullivan & Carla Baranauckas, Here’s How Much Money Goes to
Police Departments in Largest Cities Across the U.S., USA TODAY (June 26, 2020,
7:00
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/06/26/how-much-money-goes-to-policedepartments-in-americas-largest-cities/112004904/ [https://perma.cc/Z8CX-BZ3P].
11. Annie Lowrey, Defund the Police, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/defund-police/612682/
[https://perma.cc/HUX3-ZB8M].
12. See Sean Collins, The Financial Case for Defunding the Police, VOX (Sept. 23,
2020,
7:16
AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/21430892/defund-the-police-funding-abolish-georg
e-floyd-breonna-taylor-daniel-prude [https://perma.cc/CUZ4-LGX5].
13. Steven L. Hostetler & Andre B. Gammage, OK Boomers, What’s Going On?,
64 RES GESTAE 19, 27 (2020).
14. See Nicole Goodkind, The Vast Majority of Americans Don’t Want to Defund
FORTUNE
(July
9,
2020,
2:58
PM),
the
Police,
https://fortune.com/2020/07/09/defund-the-police-poll-most-americans-oppose-defund
ing-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/N363-V2J5].
15. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits
of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1451 (2016).
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support wholesale defunding and instead advocate for specific
reforms;16 35% of participants in a 2020 Pew study recorded that
the police use the correct amount of force in every situation,
compared to 45% in 2016. 17 Likewise, the share of people who
believe police treat racial and ethnic groups equally dropped from
47% in 2016 to 34% in 2020, and the share of those who thought
the justice system should hold officers accountable when
misconduct occurs rose to 44% in 2020, compared to 31% in
2016. 18 A 2018 poll found that two-thirds of people in the United
States support banning chokeholds.19
Most Americans do support disciplining police misconduct and
lessening protections against legal action. 20 Seventy-four percent of
Americans believe that police violence against the public is a problem,
and 42% believe it is a major problem.21 Nevertheless, only 25% of
Americans endorse decreased spending on police forces.22 In many
ways, polling reveals a public misunderstanding of what defunding the
police actually means. Polls indicate that people balk at the term
“defund the police” but appear more open if directly asked if they
support shifting money allocated to police toward specific social
services.23
This Article argues that discomfort with defunding the police is
misplaced. Understanding policing as a form of punishment clarifies

16. See Poll: Voters Oppose ‘Defund the Police’ but Back Major Reforms,
POLITICO
(June
17,
2020,
4:30
AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/17/poll-voters-defund-police-reforms-324774
[https://perma.cc/2YAM-Y4ZQ].
17. See Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers
for Misconduct, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 9, 2020) [hereinafter Power to Sue Police
Officers],
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/07/09/majority-of-public-favors-giving-civil
ians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-for-misconduct/
[https://perma.cc/C2BA-KCSU].
18. See id.
19. See HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., KFF HEALTH TRACKING POLL — JUNE
2020
(2020),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Topline-KFF-Health-Tracking-Poll-June-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9G4N-7MLH].
20. Two-thirds of Pew respondents and three-quarters of Kaiser participants
responded affirmatively. See id.; Power to Sue Police Officers, supra note 17.
21. See HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 19.
22. See Power to Sue Police Officers, supra note 17.
23. See Giovanni Russonello, Have Americans Warmed to Calls to ‘Defund the
Police’?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/politics/polling-defund-the-police.html
[https://perma.cc/B9VE-NLKD].
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how reforming policing — including defunding the police — fits within
the broader, more widely accepted sentencing reforms that have taken
place in recent years. The Supreme Court has refused to recognize
policing as punishment, and several scholars have commented on the
Court’s failure to do so. 24 Adding to this conversation, this Article
asserts that policing is punishment and demonstrates that policing
reform is rightly situated within discussions of overall sentencing
reform. Sentencing reform supported on both sides of the political
aisle recognizes that jurisdictions have spent money on incarceration
but have not actually accomplished punishment goals. When resources
are re-directed to support legitimate punitive goals better, then not
only are resources saved but also systemic racism can be addressed.
As it stands, purposeless punishment 25 only serves to support
institutional bias. The same is true for retaining the current system of
policing. Once one understands that the current policing model in the
United States facilitates purposeless punishment, its only remaining
plausible objective is to sustain a system of racial oppression. To truly
begin eradicating racism in policing, it is imperative to place policing
reform in the broader context of sentencing reform and begin
approaching all forms of punishment with an antiracist lens.
Part I of this Article addresses the racist roots of policing in the
United States and explores how racism is evident in police funding
structures. It explains the racial trauma associated with policing
practices and argues that defunding and restructuring policing is
necessary for rebuilding a shattered democracy. Part II confronts the
Supreme Court’s traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of excessive
force claims against police officers to reveal the failures of that
approach, examining the cases of Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, and
other Black people who have been killed by the police. Through these
tragic cases, the inadequacy of treating police use of force only under
a Fourth Amendment seizure analysis is strikingly evident. Part III
24. For a description of the Court’s error in not recognizing that the use of force by
police can be a form of punishment, see Mitchell F. Crusto, Black Lives Matter:
Banning Police Lynchings, 48 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 36–50 (2020). See also Jelani
Jefferson Exum, The Death Penalty on the Streets: What the Eighth Amendment Can
Teach About Regulating Police Use of Force, 80 MO. L. REV. 987 (2015) [hereinafter
Jefferson Exum, Death Penalty on the Streets].
25. The term “purposeless punishment” is meant to refer to punishment that does
not serve any of the recognized penological goals: incapacitation, incarceration,
rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution. For a discussion of how sentencing laws often
lead to purposeless punishment, see Jelani Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing

Equality: Moving from the “Cracked” Cocaine Debate Toward Particular Purpose
Sentencing, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 95 (2014) [hereinafter Jefferson Exum, Forget
Sentencing Equality].
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develops the argument that the courts should treat certain actions by
police as punishment subject to Eighth Amendment protection. Part
IV connects this punishment view of policing to sentencing reform
efforts to support the view that reforming policing fits within the
punishment reform context. Because recent sentencing reforms have
not adequately addressed systemic racism, Part V ends this Article by
discussing the flaws in sentencing reform and the work that still needs
to be done to address racism in all types of state-imposed punishment
— including policing.
I. POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES: SYSTEMIC RACISM, RACIAL
TRAUMA, AND THE NEED TO REBUILD DEMOCRACY

It is no secret that U.S. policing is systemically racist. The U.S.
policing model is to target discriminatorily, surveil persistently,
prosecute fervently, and punish vigorously. This includes using deadly
force against individuals through a variety of means, but most
frequently by shooting. 26 In 2019, police officers fatally shot 999
people. 27 Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the oppressive effects of this
“punitive and primitive,”28 heavy-handed approach to criminal justice
is borne by Black people.29

26. “Lethal force includes shooting of firearms, chokehold, strangulation, stun guns
aka Tasers, shooting rubber bullets, attack dogs, the injection of ketamine, aggravated
assault, simple battery, no-knock raids, and failing to come to a person’s aid in a timely
manner.” Crusto, supra note 24, at 6 n.21; see also The Counted: People Killed by
Police
in
the
US,
GUARDIAN
[hereinafter
The
Counted],
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-policekillings-us-database [https://perma.cc/RWS8-B596] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021);
MAPPING
POLICE
VIOLENCE,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org
[https://perma.cc/6ESQ-3HPN] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (providing a database of the
forms of officer-caused death, the majority of which are from gun violence).
27. See Fatal Force: 999 People Were Shot and Killed by Police in 2019, WASH.
POST
(Aug.
10,
2020)
[hereinafter
Fatal
Force],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/
[https://perma.cc/6G2K-SBWZ].
28. See Hostetler & Gammage, supra note 13, at 27.
29. See The Counted, supra note 26; Law Enforcement and Violence: The Divide
Between Black and White Americans, ASSOCIATED PRESS & NORC [hereinafter Law
Enforcement
and
Violence],
https://apnorc.org/projects/law-enforcement-and-violence-the-divide-between-black-a
nd-white-americans/ [https://perma.cc/XD7Z-QWKF] (last visited Feb. 3, 2021); see
also Ryan Gabrielson, Eric Sagara & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Deadly Force, in Black
and
White,
PROPUBLICA
(Oct.
10,
2014,
11:07
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white
[https://perma.cc/SE75-W39A].
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A. U.S. Policing Is Systemically Racist

Police officers kill Black people at more than twice the rate of white
people.30 These racially disparate outcomes are no surprise given the
roots of policing in the United States. Proponents of police defunding
rely, in part, on U.S. policing’s origin story and historical ties to slavery
in arguing for a complete overhaul of policing.31

i. The Racist Roots of Policing
It is well-documented that modern policing’s ancestry lies in slave
patrols.32 During slavery, “[t]he use of race as a ‘free-floating proxy’
for criminality” was a necessary social control and manipulation tool
and indispensable in upholding “the de facto and de jure unequal social
relationships arising out of slavery.”33 In short, “[p]olice have long
been the face of oppression to Black people.”34 Policing in the South
was forged from slave patrols, while policing in non-slave states
emerged as an effort to control and regulate the lives of free Blacks
whom they considered dangerous.35 In the South, slave patrols, whose
power derived from restrictive slave codes, wielded unlimited authority
over Black bodies.36 Their tasks were to “terrorize enslaved Blacks to
deter revolts, capture and return enslaved Blacks trying to escape, and
discipline those who violated any plantation rules.” 37 As a result,
“[s]ince America’s founding, this assumption of dangerousness
subjected free Blacks to constant scrutiny and invasion of privacy by
white authorities.”38 Professor William Carter, Jr. acknowledged the
racist underbelly of policing in labeling modern-day racial profiling as
a “‘badge and incident’ of slavery.” 39 He wrote of the stigma of

30. See, e.g., The Counted, supra note 26; Gabrielson et al., supra note 29; Law
Enforcement and Violence, supra note 29.
31. See Andrew, supra note 7.
32. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combatting Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 56–57 (2004); Brandon
Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 200, 206 (2020).
33. Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 56–57.
34. Hasbrouck, supra note 32, at 210.
35. See id. at 206.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 208.
39. See Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 86 n.358 (quoting Larry J. Pittman,

Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Dark Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth
Amendment and Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on
Disfavored Groups, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 774, 851 n.295 (1998)).
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dangerousness and criminality that, incident to slavery’s legacy,
automatically attaches to Blackness.
The stain is permanent,
burdensome, and cannot be overcome by “high personal
achievement,” “education,” “wealth,” or “personal appearance.”40 In
his words, “racial profiling is a modern manifestation of the historical
presumption, still lingering from slavery, that African Americans are
congenital criminals rightfully subject to constant suspicion because of
their skin color.”41 He further wrote:
[T]he legally enforced stereotype of black criminality has a
particularly injurious effect on African Americans, given their history
of enduring legally enforced and officially sanctioned enslavement,
apartheid and mistreatment. The image in the collective white mind
of blacks (particularly black men) as congenital criminals is perhaps
the most deeply entrenched stereotype pervading the black-white
relationship in America. The pervasiveness of this assumption
reveals that it rests upon deeply rooted historical attitudes and is not
simply the result of individual racial bias. . . .
This stigma remains one that African Americans cannot escape,
regardless of their individual circumstances.42

Professor Carter identified that the “pervasive and indiscriminate”
stigma of criminality associated with Blackness is no accident. Rather,
it is the living legacy of slavery and its progeny — systemic racism. The
entrenched racism that anchors the foundations of policing must be
unearthed and wholly dismantled. Identifying some underlying core
contributions to the bloating of police budgets is integral to
understanding the urgent call to defund.

ii. Police Funding Is Systemically Racist
Like the genesis of policing itself, the justification for exorbitant
spending on police budgets is also steeped in racism. Scholars note that
the rise in federal aid to police departments was not coincidental. An
examination of racial threat theory demonstrates this. Racial threat
theory posits that “[l]ocal increases in racial minority populations are
thought to pose threats to the political standing, economic power, and
physical safety of white citizens, who respond by lobbying local
government for increased social control.”43 Such lobbying has resulted

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 24–25.

Robert Vargas & Philip McHarris, Race and State in City Police Spending
Growth: 1980 to 2010, 3 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 96, 96 (2017).
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in increased spending on police budgets. Per racial threat theory, white
people understand the growth of communities of color as potentially
threatening to their interests and respond by urging for increased crime
controls.44 Recent studies demonstrate the systemic nature of racial
threat and spending and suggest that “racial threat operates not only
through how local governments socially control racial minorities but
also through relationships between local and federal government that
help cities afford such social control efforts.”45
The efforts to advance the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (Clinton Crime Bill), a “well-documented”
failure, 46 is one example of this. For the past 20 years, the Clinton
Crime Bill has been responsible for boosting police budgets and
keeping city police departments afloat during times of financial
distress. 47 The Clinton Crime Bill established the Office of
Community Oriented Police Services (COPS), which allocated grants
of varying sizes to municipalities to purchase equipment, move officers
from desk duty to the streets, and create community policing
programs.48 The Clinton Crime Bill is also credited with injecting over
$8 billion into budget coffers to hire more police officers.49 Today, it is
known as one of the major drivers of mass incarceration.50
Supporters of the Clinton Crime Bill utilized racialized language
emphasizing inherent Black criminality to justify passage and urge
support,51 including “references to fear of Black crime in the wake of
racially motivated riots in Los Angeles and New York” and a call “to
‘restore order in society.’” 52 This type of pressure from national
leaders often “trigger[s] local feelings of threat in the majority
population.”53 Here, the result was the construction of more jails and
prisons and the passage of a myriad of laws that significantly increased

44. See id. at 97.
45. Id. at 105.
46. See ED CHUNG, BETSY PEARL & LEA HUN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE 1994
CRIME BILL CONTINUES TO UNDERCUT JUSTICE REFORM — HERE’S HOW TO STOP IT 1
(2019),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/03/29084647/CrimeBill-Public
Safety-brief-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/757H-GVKF].
47. The other source of funding is emergency preparedness funds from the
Department of Homeland Security. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 98.
48. See id. at 99.
49. See id. at 98–99.
50. See CHUNG ET AL., supra note 46, at 1.
51. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 99.
52. Id. (internal citations omitted).
53. Id.
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incarceration lengths and extinguished opportunities for early
release.54 The Clinton Crime Bill cost taxpayers an overwhelming sum
of money55 and ushered in an era of discriminatory, ineffective, and
inefficient punishment of Black men.56
Like the Clinton Crime Bill, the current pro-America (and prowhite) atmosphere, whose fire has been stoked by a president, 57
motivates racial threat, particularly perceived threats to white financial
or political interests. 58 Racial threat theory offers that white
perceptions of communities of colors’ encroachment upon white
economic resources lead to initiatives aimed at preserving the white
status quo and white economic dominance, even in the form of
increased police spending.59
The result of this fear-based police spending over time is
unsustainable costs to state and local governments. In 35 of the 50 most
populous U.S. cities, police department appropriations generally
account for the largest budget allotment; local annual police budgets
can range from $100 million to over $5 billion, often outsizing social
services spending. 60 For example, in New Orleans, police spending
accounts for 17% of the city budget — approximately $194 million61 —
compared with $56 million budgeted for community development. 62
Chicago’s 2020 budget predicted police budget expenditures of $2
billion, 15% of the city budget.63 In 2017, state and local government
spending across the United States totaled $114 billion on police forces
alone.64

See CHUNG ET AL., supra note 46, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Jeff Maskovsky, Towards the Anthropology of White Nationalist
Postracialism, 7 HAU 433, 433 (2017); Joe Hagan & Emily Jane Fox, “Nationalism Will
Run Roughshod over Democracy”: What Can Nazi Germany Tell Us About Trump’s
GOP?,
VANITY
FAIR
(Sept.
18,
2020),
54.
55.
56.
57.

https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/what-can-nazi-germany-tell-us-about-trump
s-gop [https://perma.cc/L68R-DA6W]; Clarence Page, Trump Wants to Be Called a
‘Nationalist,’ but by Which Meaning?, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2018, 7:35 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/clarence-page/ct-perspec-page-trump-charl
es-degaulle-nationalist-globalism-davos-1025-20181024-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5GWE-N8PD].
58. See Vargas & McHarris, supra note 43, at 97.
59. See id.
60. See Sullivan & Baranauckas, supra note 10.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Collins, supra note 12.
64. See id.
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Increased police spending does not equal safer streets. In 2018,
police officers arrested or killed 62% of murder suspects65 and closed
53% of aggravated assault cases, 30% of robbery cases, and 33% of rape
cases. 66 Despite increased spending, these rates of solved crimes,
known as clearance rates, have remained roughly identical for
decades. 67 Rather than spending resources to reduce crime,
governments have been wasting resources on perpetuating racial
trauma.
B. Policing and Racial Trauma

U.S. policing, with its focus on racial profiling and racially biased
enforcement strategies,68 regularly inflicts trauma on Black people and
“undermines effective policing.”69 As a result of racial profiling, Black
people deemed criminals experience “fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger,
resentment, and cynicism.” 70 In addition to these more welldocumented destructive repercussions of police misconduct and racial
profiling, the perpetual trauma that Black people suffer at the hands of
the police provides another justification for a complete revamping of
the police system. The trauma that Black people in the United States
endure should be viewed as punishment that warrants Eighth
Amendment protection.
This Article uses the term “cultural trauma” to describe the
traumatic stress and mental and psychological impact that Black
people suffer as a result of the relentless effects of systemic oppression,
discrimination, and racism.71 Cultural trauma is a socially permitted
phenomenon that “occur[s] when groups endure horrific events that

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589–90 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (finding that the New York City Police Department was liable for a consistent
practice of racial profiling as well as unconstitutional stops); Darius Charney,
Stop-and-Frisk Report: NYPD Racial Bias Persists, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Dec. 16,
2019),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/stop-and-frisk-report-nypd-raci
al-bias-persists [https://perma.cc/5CSA-ZLF9].
69. See Carter, Jr., supra note 32, at 24.
70. S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).
71. See Thema Bryant-Davis, Healing Requires Recognition: The Case for
Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 35 COUNSELING PSYCH. 135, 135 (2007); Robert T.
Carter et al., Race-Based Traumatic Stress, Racial Identity Statuses, and Psychological
Functioning: An Exploratory Investigation, 48 PRO. PSYCH. 30, 30 (2017).

2021]

THAT IS ENOUGH PUNISHMENT

637

forever change their consciousness and identity.”72 In encountering
cultural trauma, members of a group are collectively subjected to an
atrocious, disturbing event that permanently scars group
consciousness, “marking their memories forever and changing their
future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.” 73 Due to the
United States’ burdensome and overwhelming history of
discrimination against minority groups, communities of color often
experience
shared
trauma,
transmitted
collectively
and
intergenerationally over time.74 This is especially true for Black people
in the United States, who endure routine, systemic oppression and
“chronic exposure to racism” daily.75
Cultural trauma is birthed from monumental historical events that
affect entire communities, such as “the enslavement of African
Americans; the displacement, murder, and loss of culture and land of
American Indians; the murder and torture of Jews in the Holocaust;
war; famine; mass incarceration; and forced separation from one’s
family.” 76 It requires a collective, disruptive memory that, in turn,
forms the group’s identity. For Black people, that shared, disruptive
memory is slavery. While slavery was officially abolished in the United
States with the passage and subsequent ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment in 1868, its memory endures through continued
discrimination, degradation, humiliation, and oppression.
While the vestiges of slavery and its progeny Jim Crow survive in the
form of institutionalized racism at every level of U.S. society, the actual
memory of slavery remains as the major force that unifies Black people
as a racial group.77 In this way, it is the collective remembrance of
slavery, not its experience, bolstered by slavery’s permanent legacy of
oppression, which produces cultural trauma in the Black community.78
Thus, Black people are doomed to coexist daily with discrimination

72. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Trauma of the Routine: Lessons on Cultural
Trauma from the Emmett Till Verdict, 34 SOCIO. THEORY 335, 335 (2016).
73. Id. at 336.
74. See Nicole Tuchinda, The Imperative for Trauma-Responsive Special
Education, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 796 (2020).
75. See id. (citing Kenneth V. Hardy, Healing the Hidden Wounds of Racial
Trauma, 22 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 24, 25 (2013)).
76. Id.
77. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 339. “It [is] the remembrance or
memory of slavery — ‘traumatic in retrospect’ . . . that serve[s] as a foundation for
uniting the racial group.” Id.
78. See id.
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and perpetually “primed for a traumatic response.”79 Research even
suggests that continual exposure to such trauma can affect DNA
structure, “adding a potential biological link to the mix,”80 such that
cultural trauma “come[s] to reside in the flesh [of Black people] as
forms of memory reactivated and articulated at moments of collective
spectatorship.”81
Unlike other recognized traumas, cultural trauma often assumes a
two-tiered posture, with one model appearing as more active or
pronounced than the other. However, both models emerge routinely
and are considered commonplace. In its more latent form, cultural
trauma does not require physical stressors to reveal itself.82 In its more
active form, cultural trauma disrupts incessant background trauma,
thereby augmenting the trauma narrative that Black people must
navigate.

i. Background Cultural Trauma
For Black people, background cultural trauma acts as the backdrop
to everyday life. It manifests as a “pattern of racist events . . . across
the life domains of minority citizens . . . [that] requires ongoing coping
and expenditures of psychic energy.” 83 “It provides a more precise
description of the psychological consequences of interpersonal or
institutional traumas motivated by the devaluing of one’s race,” even
in the absence of physical contact.84 As a result of three centuries of
slavery, succeeded by an additional one hundred years of legally
sanctioned violence and segregation in the form of Jim Crow, Black
people have consistently experienced racist stereotyping, wealth
disparities, education inequities, residential segregation, police
brutality, mass incarceration, and a host of other race-based

79. Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, The Trauma of Racism: Implications
for Counseling, Research, and Education, 33 COUNSELING PSYCH. 574, 575 (2005).
80. Kindaka J. Sanders, Defending the Spirit: The Right to Self-Defense Against
Psychological Assault, 19 NEV. L.J. 227, 244 (2018).
81. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 336.
82. See Bryant-Davis, supra note 71, at 137; Robert T. Carter, Katherine Kirkinis
& Veronica E. Johnson, Relationships Between Trauma Symptoms and Race-Based
Traumatic Stress, 26 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N 11, 16 (2020).
83. Thema Bryant-Davis & Carlota Ocampo, Racist Incident-Based Trauma, 33
COUNSELING PSYCH. 479, 483 (2005) [hereinafter Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, Racist
Incident-Based Trauma].
84. Bryant-Davis, supra note 71, at 137.
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indignities.85 Due to the persistence of racism in the United States,
Black people live against the backdrop of unceasing cultural trauma
that is continually “aggravated, reinforced, and reintroduced.”86
The aforementioned devaluing is implanted in the very fiber of our
society in the form of deep-seated, systemic racism, which creates
“daily minitraumas,” derived from “out-group status and de facto
segregation such as . . . being denied promotions, home mortgages, or
business loans; being a target of a security guard; or being stopped in
traffic.” 87 Though appearing seemingly unrelated to race at first
glance, these occurrences are far from racially ambiguous. These forms
of racism are ingrained and coincide with societal and political
structures that preserve the status quo, such as the police.88 For Black
people, coping with unwarranted, inexplicably incessant racism is a way
of life. Though incredibly painful, it is, quite simply, ordinary. This
type of present-day background cultural trauma slowly steeps into the
consciousness of those who suffer it and does not possess the jolting
suddenness that ordinarily marks trauma.89 Though it originates from
slavery, it currently arises and resides in familiar and habitual society-,
community-, and government-sanctioned subordination, including
racial profiling and police brutality.90

ii. Cultural Trauma from the Routine
The second, more active type of cultural trauma — cultural trauma
from the routine — suggests that even though Black people live with
background trauma, it is possible to experience increased traumatic
episodes triggered by that which is expected or routine. Three
elements must be present for cultural trauma from the routine to
materialize:
(1) [A]n established history or accumulation of the routine harm for
the trauma group; (2) widespread media attention, usually based on
preceding events, that brings regional, national, or international
attention to the occurrence of the routine harm; and (3) public
discourse . . . about the meaning of the routine harm, which consists

85. See Robert T. Carter et al., Racial Discrimination and Health Outcomes
Among Racial/Ethnic Minorities: A Meta-Analytic Review, 45 J. MULTICULTURAL
COUNSELING & DEV. 232, 232–33 (2017).
86. Sanders, supra note 80, at 243.
87. Bryant-Davis & Ocampo, Racist Incident-Based Trauma, supra note 83, at 483.
88. See id.
89. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 72, at 338.
90. See id. at 336.
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of public or official affirmation of the subordinated group’s marginal
status.91

When all three aforementioned factors converge, the ongoing,
background cultural trauma narrative widens and works to publicly
retraumatize the group in question such that they are reminded, by the
exposed shame of highlighting their subordinated status, that they have
not yet won society’s respect nor any of its attendant rights and
privileges. 92 The cultural trauma from the routine “reignites the
subordinated group’s consciousness of its second-class citizenship and
punctuates its already existing distress and suffering, thereby causing
such tensions and pains to boil over and lay a foundation for the
development of a cultural trauma narrative.”93
Black people face all three factors for creating cultural trauma from
the routine. First, the history of discrimination against Black people in
this country is robust and well-documented, and Black people have
learned to cope with and have come to expect discrimination. Second,
the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and countless others at
the hands of police have engendered incredible national media
attention, reminding the entire country of the disregard that police
have for Black lives.94 These police-initiated killings also prompt us to
recall that Black people, especially men, have been regarded,
perpetually, as violent, criminal-minded, and amoral — worthy of
being deemed guilty without process. 95 Such stereotypes are the
remnants of slavery.96 Third, the active movements to eliminate racism
and bias in all its forms throughout the country, though aimed at
alleviating oppression, simultaneously remind society of the
subordinated position Black people hold in the United States. 97

Id. at 346.
See id. at 336–37.
Id. at 337.
See Laurin-Whitney Gottbrath, In 2020, The Black Lives Matter Movement
Shook
the
World,
AL
JAZEERA
(Dec.
31,
2020),
91.
92.
93.
94.

https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/12/31/2020-the-year-black-lives-matter-shoo
k-the-world [https://perma.cc/5LHS-32V3].
95. See Robert T. Carter & Thomas D. Scheuermann, Legal and Policy Standards

for Addressing Workplace Racism: Employer Liability and Shared Responsibility for
Race-Based Traumatic Stress, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 1, 6

(2012).
96. See CalvinJohn Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug”: The
Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J.
HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T. 350, 352 (2016).
97. At times, efforts to eliminate racism or the effects of racism come with failures
that reminds us of the oppressed position that Blacks hold in the United States. See,
e.g., Tony Norman, Tony Norman: Another Sticky Development at Allegheny County
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George Floyd’s death disrupted the daily background cultural trauma
that Black Americans face and thrusted it into the spotlight in a
welcoming and highly retraumatizing way. The cultural trauma that
Black Americans must suffer from the routine experience of police
brutality is more than debilitating — it is, quite simply, exhausting.
The oppression that Black Americans face daily may be described
as “a process of dehumanization that creates social and physical
isolation, as well as lack of access and blocked opportunities in
education, employment, health, and sociopolitical status.”98 Cultural
trauma is a cognizable pain that, through targeted and deliberate
measures, can be successfully interrupted.99 It must be noted that the
change sought is not only for an end to police brutality — that is but
the impetus — the change sought is an appeal for the abolishment of
institutionalized racism. That can begin with defunding the police as a
part of reforming punishment as a whole. The integrity of the entire
criminal justice system demands such change.
C. Rebuilding Democracy

In addition to the harm exacted on specific individuals and
communities of color, racial profiling and police brutality also
“damage[] law enforcement and the criminal justice system as a whole
by undermining public confidence and trust in the police, the courts,
and the criminal law.”100 Mistrust in the overall system is no trivial
Common Pleas Court, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 7, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/tony-norman/2020/02/07/Mark-Tranquilli-Juro
r-heroin-Black-History-Month-CMU-neighborhoods-Michigan-State-University/stori
es/202002070044 [https://perma.cc/PHJ9-63CQ] (Carnegie Melon University posted a
map of Pittsburgh online for its prospective students that excluded all historically Black
neighborhoods). In other instances, the effort to sanction racist behavior itself opens
wounds caused by racism. See, e.g., Anthony Conroy, PA’s Legislative Black Caucus
Demands Investigation of Allegheny County Judge, Alleged Racist Comments,
POST-GAZETTE
(Feb.
12,
2020,
12:37
PM),
PITTSBURGH
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2020/02/12/PA-black-legislative-cauc
us-investigation-Allegheny-County-judge-Mark-Tranquilli-racist-comments/stories/2
02002120118 [https://perma.cc/C8W3-TERE].
98. Carter et al., supra note 85, at 232–33.
99. See, e.g., Nia West-Bey, Young Minds Matter: Historical and Cultural Trauma,
CTR.
FOR
L.
&
SOC.
POL’Y
(Oct.
9,
2019),
https://www.clasp.org/blog/young-minds-matter-historical-and-cultural-trauma
[https://perma.cc/X7FC-5DWR].
100. End Racial Profiling Act, S. 989 § 2(a)(9), 107th Cong. (2001). The
Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus (PLBC) called for the State’s Judicial Conduct
Board to investigate racist comments allegedly made by Allegheny County Common
Pleas Judge Mark Tranquilli, who was accused of repeatedly referring to a Black
female juror as “Aunt Jemima.” See Austin Davis, PLBC Urges Judicial Conduct
Review Board to Investigate Allegheny County Judge, PAHOUSE.COM (Feb. 12, 2020),
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matter, as the criminal justice system is rendered impotent when
people become unconvinced of its efficacy.101 As with all government
systems, the criminal justice system must regard public perceptions of
fairness and justice102 to ensure “higher levels of cooperation and lower
rates of recidivism.”103 People are simply less compliant with, and are
more likely to rebel against, laws they perceive as unjust or “with the
law generally when they perceive the criminal justice system as
tolerating such injustice.” 104 Unless the criminal justice system’s
outcomes and processes are deemed fair, the system is of little value.
According to scholars, “a criminal justice system derives practical
value by generating societal perceptions of fair enforcement and
adjudication.”105 These perceptions can be distilled into two distinct
types: (1) legitimacy and (2) moral credibility.106 Legitimacy requires
that criminal processes are fairly, accurately, and uniformly
executed. 107 Moral credibility demands fairness and equitable
outcomes.108 Legitimacy and moral credibility allow people to believe
that the criminal justice system works and, for that reason, choose to
behave lawfully.109 The criminal justice system simply cannot function
effectively if the general population refuses to believe in and conform
to its laws.
The legitimacy theory suggests that people adapt their behavior to a
system of criminal laws, policies, and programs because they believe
that the process is fair. 110 The perception of fair process induces a
commitment to fully participate in the system by adjusting one’s

https://www.pahouse.com/ADavis/InTheNews/NewsRelease/?id=112585
[https://perma.cc/Z77W-TD2U]. Recognizing the pain of racism, PLBC Chairman
Representative Stephen Kinsey said, “[t]his chants back to a deep-rooted and
pervasive problem in our criminal justice system, not only in our commonwealth, but
across our nation, a system that disproportionately targets black and brown bodies.”

Id.

101. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE

FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2012).
102. See Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1361, 1386 (2003).
103. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 101, at 253.
104. Id. at 262.
105. Id. at 211.
106. See id. at 211–19.
107. See id. at 215.
108. See id. at 218–19.
109. See id. at 211–18.
110. See id. at 214.
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conduct to comport with the system’s requirements.111 Per legitimacy
theory,
citizens of a procedurally just state comport their behavior to the
substantive dictates of the law not because the state exercises coercive
power . . . but because they feel a normative commitment to the state.
. . . [A]n individual . . . complies with the law not because he rationally
calculates that it is in his best interest to do so but because he sees
himself as a moral actor who divines that it is right to defer to
legitimate authority.112

Fair process, then, leads to increased compliance with and belief in the
law. The perception of justice does as well.
The moral credibility aspect of fair enforcement and adjudication
contends that “[d]oing justice may be the most effective means of
fighting crime.”113 While legitimacy contemplates the process aspect
of criminal justice, moral credibility ponders the punishment facet of
criminal justice.114 Per moral credibility, the criminal justice system is
rendered legitimate if it appeals to a community’s shared intuitions of
justice, but succumbs to invalidity if it does not.115
Some of the system’s power to gain compliance derives from its
potential to stigmatize . . . . Yet a criminal law can stigmatize only if
it has earned moral credibility with the community it governs. That
is, for conviction to trigger community stigmatization, the law must
have earned a reputation with the community for accurately reflecting
the community’s views on what deserves moral condemnation. A
criminal law with liability and punishment rules that conflict with a
community’s shared intuitions of justice will undermine its moral
credibility.116

As the public becomes more aware of the pervasive nature of policeinitiated violence, support for reform increases. Several recent polls
indicate that the American people support broad-based criminal
justice reform. In one 2020 poll, approximately two-thirds of a large
sampling of Democrats and Republicans reported support for

111. See id. “People come to obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities
because they perceive their institutions to operate fairly,” such that “perceptions of
procedural fairness facilitate a kind of normative, as opposed to purely instrumental,
crime control.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 216.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 217.
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candidates who advocate criminal justice reform. 117 They also
expressed overwhelming support for mandating body cameras,
prohibiting no-knock warrants, and forbidding chokeholds when lethal
force is not necessary; 88% supported mandatory investigations by the
Department of Justice into the use of lethal force, and 82% supported
the implementation of a national database on officer misconduct.118
Yet another poll compared today’s attitudes concerning police
brutality to those from five years ago. It concluded that Americans are
currently much more likely to agree that police violence is a serious
problem for which police should be punished.119 Likewise, in another
poll, 84% of Black people and 63% of white people agreed that the
police treat Black people less favorably than white people.120 These
statistics reveal that the time is ripe for reform. The legitimacy and
moral credibility models suggest that reform is absolutely necessary but
accomplishing police reform on such a grand scale is no easy task.121
As Part II addresses, this is, at least in part, because of the Supreme
Court’s position regarding the reasonableness of police action.

117. See Evan Mintz, New Polling Finds Extraordinary Bipartisan Support for
Policing
Reforms,
ARNOLD
VENTURES
(Aug.
25,
2020),

https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/new-polling-finds-extraordinary-bipartisan-su
pport-for-policing-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/5GSY-L2AY].
118. See id.
119. See Associated Press, New Poll Shows 94% of Americans Back Criminal Justice
MARKETWATCH
(June
23,
2020,
10:48
AM),
Reform,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/new-poll-shows-94-of-americans-back-criminal-j
ustice-reform-2020-06-23 [https://perma.cc/C6RU-VMAE].
120. See John Gramlich, From Police to Parole, Black and White Americans Differ
Widely in Their Views of Criminal Justice System, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 21, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/21/from-police-to-parole-black-and-w
hite-americans-differ-widely-in-their-views-of-criminal-justice-system/
[https://perma.cc/J2BP-MWTX].
121. See, e.g., Jesse Jackson, Police Reform Was Never Going to Be Easy — But
Now’s the Time, CHI.-SUN TIMES (June 8, 2020, 4:30 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/2020/6/8/21284553/police-reform-george-floy
d-police-brutality-jesse-jackson-kamala-harris
[https://perma.cc/9EZB-7SBK];
Amanda Taub, Police the Public or Protect It? For a U.S. in Crisis, Hard Lessons from
Other
Countries,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/world/police-brutality-protests.html
[https://perma.cc/U6QD-PQ3X]; Simone Weichselbaum & Nicole Lewis, Support for
Defunding the Police Department Is Growing. Here’s Why It’s Not a Silver Bullet,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(June
9,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/09/support-for-defunding-the-police-dep
artment-is-growing-here-s-why-it-s-not-a-silver-bullet
[https://perma.cc/MNK3-UU4Y].
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II. AN UNREASONABLENESS VIEW OF POLICING

Despite national attention to police violence, there is still a prevalent
misconception that policing and punishment are different issues. Much
of this is because of the way policing has been characterized in the
courts. The Supreme Court analyzes excessive police force claims
under the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
seizures.122 But the actual consequences of police force — especially
the use of deadly force by police — are often more akin to punishment
than a simple seizure. While it may be that police officers have seized
a person when they use force against them,123 confining police force
cases to the traditional Fourth Amendment analysis has unnecessarily
limited appropriate methods of challenging police conduct. A closer
look at the reasonableness standard applied to cases claiming
unconstitutional policing reveals its extreme shortcomings.
A. The Traditional Fourth Amendment Reasonable Force Standard

To challenge a police officer’s use of force as excessive, a plaintiff
must claim their seizure by police officers was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. In the 1989 case Graham v. Connor, the Court
held that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive
force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop,
or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
The
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” 124
reasonableness of police action is judged “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.”125 This “‘reasonableness’ inquiry . . . is an objective one,”
asking “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
to their underlying intent or motivation.”126
Graham reiterated the Court’s position taken five years earlier in
Tennessee v. Garner, which considered “the constitutionality of the use
of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently unarmed
suspected felon.”127 In Garner, two police officers were dispatched to
122. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989).
123. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains the freedom of
a person to walk away. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)).
124. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
125. Id. at 396 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22).
126. Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 437 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978); Terry, 392
U.S. at 21).
127. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
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investigate an ongoing home invasion.128 One of the officers spied the
suspect running across the backyard of the targeted home, apparently
leaving the scene.129 Although the officer was “reasonably sure” the
suspect, Edward Garner, did not have a weapon, the officer still shot
him in the back of the head as he was climbing over a fence.130 The
officer rationalized that he felt convinced that if he did not shoot
Garner, then Garner would have escaped. 131 Garner died at the
hospital.132
The Court, analyzing the claim of excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment, held that “[deadly] force may not be used unless it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others.”133 In this particular case, the
Court found the deadly force unreasonable because the officer did not
have probable cause to believe that the unarmed Garner posed any
danger to officers or the public.134 The Court explained:
[N]otwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may
not always do so by killing him. The intrusiveness of a seizure by
means of deadly force is unmatched. The suspect’s fundamental
interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon. The use of
deadly force also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of
society, in judicial determination of guilt and punishment.135

Thus, the Court recognized the narrow circumstances in which killing
a suspect is reasonable, thereby acknowledging that when police
officers seize someone by killing them, they rob that person and society
of an essential part of the criminal process — judicial determination of
guilt and punishment. Though the Court has not recognized it, officers
in this situation frustrate the judicial determination of guilt and
punishment and impose on it their own.

128. See id.
129. See id. at 3–4.
130. See id. at 3.
In using deadly force to prevent the escape, [the officer] was acting under the
authority of a Tennessee statute and pursuant to Police Department policy.
The statute provides that “[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the
necessary means to effect the arrest.”
Id. at 4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 3.
134. See id. at 21.
135. Id. at 9.
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In Garner, the Supreme Court further discussed the limited
effectiveness of deadly force to accomplish criminal justice goals:
[W]e are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently
productive means of accomplishing them to justify the killing of
nonviolent suspects. The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way
of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice
mechanism in motion. If successful, it guarantees that that
mechanism will not be set in motion.136

Garner recognized the gravity of deadly force but failed to admit that
the “mechanism” of criminal justice will not be set in motion when the
police use deadly force because the intention of the officer is to impose
punishment, rendering the mechanism unnecessary. The Court
reiterated this reality-blind approach to police force in Graham v.
Connor.
Graham v. Connor highlights the Court’s failure to recognize the
true punishment nature of policing. The plaintiff, Dethorne Graham,
a Black man, suffered from Type 1 diabetes and felt the onset of an
insulin reaction.137 He asked a friend to drive him to a convenience
store to buy orange juice to stabilize the reaction.138 Once at the store,
Graham went inside but quickly decided to leave after determining
that the line was too long and asked his friend to drive him to another
friend’s house for assistance.139 Officer Connor, also Black, observed
Graham hurriedly leave the store, became suspicious, and pulled
Graham over to investigate further.140 Graham and his friend tried to
explain that Berry was experiencing a “sugar reaction,” but Officer
Conner ordered the men to wait while he found whether anything had
happened at the convenience store.141 While Officer Connor was in his
patrol car calling for backup, Graham exited the car, ran around it
twice, and then sat on the curb and passed out for a short time.142 Once
backup arrived, the officers rolled the still unconscious Graham over
on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands behind his back tightly.143 One of
the officers reportedly said, “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar
diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 386 (1989).
See id. at 388.
See id. at 388–89.
See id. at 389.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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but drunk. Lock the S.B. up.”144 Several of the officers then lifted
Graham up, carried him over to his friend’s car, and placed him face
down on its hood.145 When Graham regained consciousness and asked
the officers to check in his wallet for a diabetic sticker that he carried,
an officer told him to “shut up” and shoved his face down against the
hood of the car.146 Four officers then grabbed Graham and threw him
headfirst into a police cruiser.147 Even when Graham’s friend brought
some orange juice to the car, the officers refused to let him have it.148
Eventually, after receiving a report that Graham had done nothing
wrong at the convenience store, the officers drove him home and let
him go.149
Due to the police encounter, Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts
on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder.150 Rather
than viewing the police action as punishment, the Court applied the
traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. 151 The
Supreme Court remanded the case, instructing the lower court to
reconsider, in light of the proper Fourth Amendment standard,
“whether the officers’ actions [we]re ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting them.”152 What this standard
misses is just what an Eighth Amendment punishment analysis could
have considered: the officers’ cruelty in their treatment of Graham.
The Supreme Court curtly dismissed the Eighth Amendment
applicability, stating,
[d]iffering standards under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments are
hardly surprising: the terms “cruel” and “punishments” clearly
suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the term
“unreasonable” does not. Moreover, the less protective Eighth
Amendment standard applies “only after the State has complied with
the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions.” The Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of “objective
reasonableness” under the circumstances, and subjective concepts
like “malice” and “sadism” have no proper place in that inquiry.153

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 390.
See id. at 394–95.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398–99.
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By focusing the analysis on objective reasonableness, the Court
diminishes the police-individual encounter to one that depends upon
the inconsistent views of prosecutors or jurors about what is
appropriate. A punishment approach to policing would allow for the
legal standards of non-arbitrariness, proportionality, and respect for
human dignity to have a more uniform application to police encounters
where officers use force. This is not to say that police punishment
would only be deemed unconstitutional if an individual can prove that
the officer acted with subjective malice. However, a state’s malice and
sadism in allowing a certain level of unjustified and excessive
punishment should certainly be relevant factors. By applying a
traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis to excessive
force claims, the Court has not effectively protected the individual’s
“fundamental interest” in their own lives. 154 Instead, it employed a
standard that leads to inconsistent, and often unjust, outcomes. It only
takes a survey of recent reports of killings by police officers for that
failed protection to become apparent.
B. The Failures of the Reasonableness Standard

The death penalty on the streets155 — when police officers kill an
individual as punishment for that person’s objectionable behavior —
operates outside of the criminal justice system’s procedural safeguards.
Between 2005 and 2015, police officers fatally shot around 1,000 people
each year, but only 54 officers faced criminal charges.156 Judging police

154. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
155. For further explanation of the concept of deadly police force being the death
penalty on the streets, see Jefferson Exum, Death Penalty on the Streets, supra note
24. See also TEDx Talks, The Death Penalty on the Street, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sq7eAEjJm6U [https://perma.cc/AQP7-VAHE].
156. See Matt Ferner & Nick Wing, Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of
Murder Last Year for On-Duty Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:34
AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/police-shooting-convictions_n_5695968ce4b086bc1cd
5d0da [https://perma.cc/29RN-3AX3]; Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
11,
2015),
Dead,
Few
Prosecuted,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-pros
ecuted/ [https://perma.cc/S5CB-EAUX]. Parenthetically, many of these cases result in
expensive settlements of wrongful death claims. See, e.g., Nick Wing, We Pay a

Shocking Amount for Police Misconduct, and Cops Want Us to Accept It. We
Shouldn’t,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(May
29,
2015,
7:39
AM),

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/police-misconduct-settlements_n_7423386
[https://perma.cc/ML27-RD7M]. For a specific example of the rate of deadly police
force compared to convictions, see Eric Levenson, What Georgia Law Says About
When Police Can Use Deadly Force, CNN (June 15, 2020, 3:22 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/15/us/rayshard-brooks-force-law/index.html
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use of force by its reasonableness, which is informed by police officers’
discretionary judgment, has contributed to an unjust system. This is
especially true for those who have lost their lives in police encounters
when the use of non-fatal police tactics could have safely avoided that
loss of life. The tragedies of Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, and
other unarmed individuals killed by police officers who went
unpunished for their actions demonstrate the incompleteness of the
reasonableness standard.

i. Breonna Taylor
On March 13, 2020, in Louisville, Kentucky, police killed Breonna
Taylor, a 26-year Black woman, in her home. 157 Breonna, an
emergency room technician, was asleep in her bed when she and her
boyfriend were roused by a loud knocking on their apartment door at
12:40 AM.158 She was killed by at least five of the more than 20 bullets
fired by three white, plainclothes police officers who used a battering
ram to force entry into her home pursuant to a no-knock warrant.159
The Kentucky Attorney General did not present any charges for her
death to the grand jury despite nationwide calls for
#JusticeForBreonna.160
According to Breonna’s boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, he and
Breonna were in bed sleeping when they were startled awake by loud

[https://perma.cc/MT5K-NQUK] (“From 2015 to 2020, police in Georgia have shot and
killed 182 people, according to The Washington Post’s Fatal Force tracker. In that
time, only one Georgia officer has been charged with murder.”).
157. See Arian Campo-Flores & Sabrina Siddiqui, Police Killing of Breonna Taylor
Fuels Calls to End No-Knock Warrants, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-killing-of-breonna-taylor-fuels-calls-to-end-no-kn
ock-warrants-11590332400 [https://perma.cc/7EE7-D9B7]. Black women are victims of
varying forms of police brutality, including fatal shootings, rape, and maiming. See
Mary-Elizabeth Murphy, Black Women Are the Victims of Police Violence, Too,
WASH.
POST
(July
24,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/24/police-violence-happens-against
-women-too/ [https://perma.cc/M8EK-6TMX]. See generally KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET
AL., SAY HER NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2016).
158. See Tessa Duvall, Fact Check 2.0: Debunking 9 Widely Shared Rumors in the
Breonna Taylor Police Shooting, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 8, 2021, 7:38 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/16/breonna-taylor-fact-che
ck-7-rumors-wrong/5326938002/ [https://perma.cc/NVJ6-7KSX].
159. See id.; Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas
Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html
[https://perma.cc/D849-4JH7].
160. See Duvall, supra note 158.
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banging at the door.161 They called out to ask who was at the door but
only received more loud banging in response.162 Frightened that an
assailant was trying to break into the home, Kenneth grabbed his
legally registered handgun, and he and Breonna began walking slowly
toward the door. 163 Just as the couple emerged from the bedroom,
officers barged into the apartment, knocking the door off its hinges
with a battering ram.164 Frightened and unable to see who was there
in the dark, Kenneth fired a warning shot toward the floor.165 While
initial reports of the event stated that the shot struck one of the officers,
Sergeant Jonathan Mattingly, in the thigh, the Kentucky State ballistics
report casted doubt on it being Kenneth who shot Sergeant
Mattingly.166 What is undisputed, however, is that the four officers on
the scene opened fire immediately following Kenneth’s warning
shot.167 One of the officers, Detective Brett Hankison, went outside,
behind the apartment building, and blindly shot ten rounds into the
apartment through a window with drawn blinds.168 An ambulance was
called to the scene to render aid to Sergeant Mattingly, but Breonna
was left coughing and struggling to breathe on the floor of her home
for nearly five minutes before emergency aid was sent to her
location.169 And this was only after Kenneth, still unaware that it was
the police who were in the apartment, called 911 and cried, “I don’t
know what’s happening. Somebody kicked in the door and shot my
girlfriend.”170 Aid did not arrive for Breonna for more than 20 minutes

161. See The Daily, The Killing of Breonna Taylor, Part 2, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
New
York
Times
Podcast,
Part
2],
2020)
[hereinafter
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/10/podcasts/the-daily/Breonna-Taylor.html
[https://perma.cc/GN3F-CD56]; Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159.
162. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
163. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
164. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
165. See Andrew Wolfson, Ballistics Report Doesn’t Support Kentucky AG’s Claim
That Breonna Taylor’s Boyfriend Shot Cop, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/27/ballistics-report-breonna-tayl
or-boyfriend-kenneth-walker-shot-louisville-cop/3554995001/
[https://perma.cc/JK3H-W8TP].
166. See id.
167. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
168. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
169. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159.
170. New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161.
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after the officers’ bullets struck her.171 Breonna was already deceased
by that time.172 Police never found drugs in her apartment.173
The outcome in Breonna’s case lets us know that in the U.S. policing
system, it is considered reasonable for the police to kill someone in
their own home when all they are doing is peacefully sleeping. Though
the underlying facts leading up to Breonna’s death are contested, the
Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) claimed it believed a
former boyfriend of Breonna had used her apartment to receive
packages of illegal drugs.174 Breonna was no longer in a relationship
with that man, but officers were able to procure a warrant to search her
apartment, which she shared with her sister and niece (who were not at
home that night).175 LMPD had initially procured a no-knock warrant
to enter the home, but those orders had been changed before the raid
to require the officers to knock and announce their presence when they
executed the warrant.176 Either way, the officers claimed they knocked
and announced their presence several times before forcibly opening
the door when they received no response.177 However, Kenneth and
several others who lived in the apartment building said the police never
announced themselves.178
Breonna Taylor’s tragic killing received national attention during
the summer 2020 protests.179 The troubling details about the night she
was killed raised serious questions about the truthfulness of the officers
involved and the trustworthiness of the system that has supported and
protected them. For instance, the officers’ incident report chronicling
that night contained multiple inaccuracies. It listed that Breonna had
no injuries, even though she had been shot several times and died on
the scene.180 The report indicated the officers had not forced their way
into the apartment despite using a battering ram to break Breonna’s

171. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. For a thorough account of the situation, see New York Times Podcast, Part 2,
supra note 161. See also The Daily, The Killing of Breonna Taylor, Part 1, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/podcasts/the-daily/breonna-taylor.html
[https://perma.cc/L5A3-STDY].
176. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159.
177. See id.
178. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161; Oppel Jr. et al., supra
note 159.
179. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 159.
180. See id.
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door down.181 There was no body camera footage from the shooting
despite it occurring during an organized, pre-planned raid.182
Some have questioned why the officers received a warrant in the first
place, especially since the police had already located the main suspect
elsewhere by the time of the raid. And, of course, many had questioned
why officers would choose to raid in the middle of the night when they
apparently thought that Breonna lived alone at her apartment and did
not suspect her of a violent crime.183 Despite all of these questions, a
jury will not have the opportunity to weigh the credibility of the
officers’ story in a criminal trial.
In September 2020 — six months after Breonna was killed and three
months after protests erupted throughout the country decrying police
violence against Black people — a Kentucky grand jury indicted
Hankison on three counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree
for “conduct which creates a substantial danger of death or serious
physical injury to another person . . . under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 184 The charges were
not for killing Breonna but for the shots he fired that tore through
Breonna’s apartment walls and entered a neighboring apartment,
endangering the three people within that apartment. 185 Those
individuals were not shot.186 So, instead of any officers facing charges
for their actions that led to Breonna’s death, only one officer faces a
Class D felony, carrying a sentence of only up to five years in prison,
for shots that did not kill anyone.187
In an unprecedented move, a concerned grand juror filed a court
motion requesting that the transcripts of the grand jury proceedings be
released to the public,188 accusing Kentucky Attorney General Daniel
Cameron of using the grand jurors “as a shield to deflect accountability

See id.
See id.
See id.; see also Duvall, supra note 158.
Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What Is ‘Wanton Endangerment,’ The Charge in
Breonna
Taylor’s
Case?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
23,
2020),
181.
182.
183.
184.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/us/wanton-endangerment.html
[https://perma.cc/59S7-VNZX].
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Transcript: Grand Juror in Breonna Taylor Case Calls for Release of
Proceeding Records, Transcripts Press Conference, REV (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/transcript-grand-juror-in-breonna-taylor-case-ca
lls-for-release-of-proceeding-records-transcripts-press-conference
[https://perma.cc/5EYB-EX58].
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and responsibility.”189 On October 2, 2020, approximately 15 hours of
the grand jury proceeding audio recordings were released,190 but they
left more questions about the reasonableness of the officers’ actions,
and the raid in general, than answers. Though social commentary
focused on whether officers were reasonable in opening fire once
Kenneth shot Sergeant Mattingly, grand jurors were concerned about
the beginning of the story. They raised several questions about
whether Kenneth had been named in the search warrant (he was not)
and what exactly the officers saw when they entered the apartment.191
They also asked whether the officers involved were aware that the
main suspect had already been apprehended.192 The jurors wanted to
know if the police had recovered drugs or money from the apartment
and were told they had not.193 In fact, they were informed that the
police had not even searched the apartment for drugs during that
raid.194 The grand jurors asked whether there were diagrams of the
scene and were told that there were none. 195 They asked why the
officers’ body cameras were not recording and were told by the
questioned detective he did not know.196 Grand jurors heard from at
least two police officers involved that they knocked and announced
their presence multiple times before forcing their way into the
apartment. 197 However, it does not appear that grand jurors heard
from Breonna’s neighbors, though nearly a dozen of those neighbors
have said they heard loud banging but never heard officers identify
themselves as police.198 Apparently, jurors were uncomfortable with
how the raid unfolded from the very beginning. There were instances
when the jurors seemed dubious of the videos and photographs they

189. Tessa Duvall, Breonna Taylor Grand Juror Wants the Truth to Come Out. Why
That Wish May Come True, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 24, 2021, 7:52 PM),

https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/09/29/breonnataylor-case-grand-jurors-attorney-speaks-out-transcript-release/3571228001/
[https://perma.cc/M3KK-FCA9].
190. See Will Wright, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & John Eligon, Breonna Taylor
Grand Jury Audio Reveals Conflicting Accounts of Fatal Raid, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/02/us/breonna-taylor-grand-jury-audio-recording.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3MFY-LVSD].
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.; see also New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161.
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were being shown.199 With all of these questions, what would have
been very illuminating would be knowing how the jury was instructed
on the applicable law. However, that information — which should
have included some instructions on reasonableness — was not included
in the released portions of the proceedings.
The tapes provide no clarity on how Cameron instructed the grand
jurors to consider the other officers’ actions. The released portions of
the grand jury audio do not include any statements or
recommendations from the prosecutors on which charges they believe
should be levied against the officers.200 In fact, Cameron has said that
the jurors were told the two officers whose shots likely killed Breonna
were justified in their actions. 201 The argument that those officers
acted reasonably is that they returned fire only after Kenneth fired
upon them, even though individuals are legally empowered to use a
firearm to protect their home from intruders.
Ultimately, both the grand jury and a trial jury were robbed of the
opportunity to actually consider the reasonableness of the other
officers’ actions in light of all of the circumstances of that night. In an
unusual decision, a Kentucky judge allowed grand jurors in Breonna’s
case to speak publicly about the proceedings, ruling that such
disclosure was in “the interest of all citizens to have confidence in the
integrity of the justice system.”202 The two grand jurors who chose to
make statements reported that prosecutors did not take their questions

199. See New York Times Podcast, Part 2, supra note 161.
200. See id. (stating the complaining grand juror said that Cameron was deflecting
blame by representing that the grand jurors decided not to indict the other officers for
Breonna Taylor’s death).
201. See Griff Witte & Mark Berman, With Breonna Taylor Decision, Summer’s
Anguished Protests Get Fresh Impetus for the Fall, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2020, 11:00
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/with-breonna-taylor-decision-summers-ang
uished-protests-get-fresh-impetus-for-the-fall/2020/09/23/1cd15f38-fddb-11ea-8d05-9b
eaaa91c71f_story.html [https://perma.cc/B6AR-5PHQ]. It is widely understood that
prosecutors can secure indictments from grand jurors when they desire to do so.
Therefore, if Cameron wanted the grand jury to indict the other officers, he almost
certainly could have presented the facts and secured an indictment. See Dylan
Stableford, Extremely Rare for Grand Jury Not to Return Indictment, Statistics Show,
YAHOO
NEWS
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://news.yahoo.com/ferguson-federal-grand-jury-indictment-statistics-history-134
942645.html [https://perma.cc/5ZCQ-N752]; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Grand

Juries Almost Always Indict, Federal Stats Show; Is There a Shooting Exception for
Cops?,
ABA
J.
(Nov.
26,
2014,
6:58
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/grand_juries_almost_always_indict_federal_
stats_show_is_there_a_cop_shootin [https://perma.cc/U9TG-FXN4].
202. Anonymous Grand Juror #1 v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 20-CI-005721
(Jefferson Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 2020).
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seriously and there was an “uproar” when the grand jurors realized the
police officers would not be charged with Breonna Taylor’s death.203
As Grand Juror #1 stated, “[w]as justice . . . done? No, I feel that there
was . . . quite a bit more that could have been done or should have been
presented for us to deliberate on.”204 Despite this injustice, even if the
grand jurors had been given the answers they sought and had been
instructed appropriately, it is questionable whether the reasonableness
standard would have led to justice for Breonna.

ii. Michael Brown
As previously explained, traditionally, in use of force cases,
reasonableness is the default conclusion, even when the individual
killed is unarmed and even when that individual was committing either
no criminal offense, or an extremely minor one. 205 The story of
Michael Brown further illustrates the consequences of a traditional
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. On August 9, 2014,
Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed 18-year-old Michael Brown —
an unarmed Black male — in Ferguson, Missouri.206 Though in the
weeks following the shooting, it was alleged that Michael had robbed a
convenience store just before his encounter with Officer Wilson, Police
Chief Tom Jackson reported after the shooting that Officer Wilson was
not aware of the alleged robbery. 207 Rather, Officer Wilson first

203. See Elizabeth Joseph, Breonna Taylor Grand Jurors Say There Was an
‘Uproar’ When They Realized Officers Wouldn’t Be Charged with Her Death, CNN

(Oct.
30,
2020,
5:18
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/29/us/breonna-taylor-grand-jurors/index.html
[https://perma.cc/5G3D-8BZY].
204. Id.
205. See supra Part II.
206. See Monica Davey & Julia Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police
Officer
Is
Not
Indicted,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-bro
wn-grand-jury.html [https://perma.cc/T5X7-KVCR]; Timeline of Events in Shooting of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62
[https://perma.cc/PF28-QATE]. For a comprehensive explanation of the Michael
Brown shooting, see Larry Buchanan et al., Report: What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/report-what-happened-in-ferguson.
html [https://perma.cc/PVE9-3UPJ].
207. See Joe Millitzer & Vera Culley, Chief Jackson: The Convenience Store
Robbery and Michael Brown Shooting Not Connected, FOX2NOW (Aug. 15, 2014, 2:56
PM),
https://fox2now.com/news/live-updates-ferguson-police-chief-tom-jackson-speaks-ata-press-conference [https://perma.cc/CR7N-JZ8F].
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approached Michael for standing in the street and impeding traffic.208
A number of witness accounts stated that Michael had his hands up in
surrender when Officer Wilson fatally shot him.209 Others claimed that
just before Officer Wilson shot him, Michael wrestled Officer Wilson
for his gun, ran away, and then came charging back at him in a rage.210
Officer Wilson’s reasonability was never determined by a judge
because no criminal charges were ever filed.
However, the
reasonableness analysis is embedded in the Missouri law presented to
a St. Louis County grand jury which decided not to indict the officer.211
Missouri Revised Statute Section 563.046 allows a law enforcement
officer to use deadly force to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of
a criminal suspect “[w]hen the officer reasonably believes that such use
of deadly force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest . . . and also
reasonably believes that the person to be arrested . . . [h]as committed
or attempted to commit a felony.” 212 The statute conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s directive on the use of deadly force in Tennessee v.
Garner.213 Therefore, the State of Missouri allows police officers to
use deadly force to carry out an arrest or prevent a suspect’s escape
only when that officer “reasonably believes” that the suspect is
attempting to flee using a deadly weapon or that the suspect “may
endanger life or inflict serious physical injury unless arrested without
delay.”214

208. In his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson explained what caught his attention
about Michael Brown:
I see them walking down the middle of the street. And first thing that struck
me was they’re walking in the middle of the street. I had already seen a couple
cars trying to pass, but they couldn’t have traffic normal because they were in
the middle, so one had to stop to let the car go around and then another car
would come.
Transcript of Grand Jury at 207, Missouri v. Wilson (Sept. 16, 2014).
209. See Conor Friedersdorf, Witnesses Saw Michael Brown Attacking — and
Others
Saw
Him
Giving
Up,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/11/major-contradictions-in-eyewit
ness-accounts-of-michael-browns-death/383157/ [https://perma.cc/U9L2-TNA8].
210. See id.
211. See MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2) (2000); Ryan J. Reilly, Ferguson Officer
Darren Wilson Not Indicted in Michael Brown Shooting, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24,
2014, 9:25 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/michael-brown-grand-jury_n_6159070
[https://perma.cc/R9U4-SLH3].
212. MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046.3(2).
213. 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (concluding that deadly force “may not be used unless it is
necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others”).
214. MAI-CR 3d 306.14.
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The problem in the Darren Wilson case is that prosecutors gave the
jurors both statements of the law at different times in the process.215 In
either iteration of the law, however, the reasonableness standard was
present. Given the erroneous instruction, the confusion for the jury
would have been with what Officer Wilson was required to reasonably
believe — that deadly force was necessary to conduct the arrest of
Michael, or that Michael was a threat to the officer or the public if
Officer Wilson did not contain him. The grand jury was never asked
whether Officer Wilson followed non-fatal encounter procedures
before resorting to deadly force. This is, of course, because the law
does not require such an inquiry. There is no consensus in the courts
of law or public opinion on what constitutes reasonable force by a
police officer. This disagreement regarding the reasonableness of
Officer Wilson’s actions sparked a national “Hands Up” movement
against police violence that garnered international attention.216 The
phenomenon #BlackLivesMatter became not just a trending hashtag
but a movement calling for a focus on human value in the police use of
force debate.217 On the other side of the wide divide was significant
support for Officer Wilson in online support groups and donations of
over $100,000 raised for him and his family.218 This stark division is
evidence of the reasonableness standard’s inadequacy.

215. For an explanation of the confused legal standard used in the Darren Wilson
grand jury proceedings, see Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Dir.-Couns., NAACP Legal
Def.
Fund,
to
J.
Maura
McShane
3–6
(Jan.
5,
2015),
http://www.naacpldf.org/document/ldf-open-letter-judge-maura-mcshane
[https://perma.cc/PF6Y-LLXP].
216. See, e.g., Callie Crossley, Michael Brown, One Year Later: The Tragic Civil
Rights Movement That Ignited a Movement, WORLD (Aug. 9, 2015, 9:30 AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-03/Michael-brown-one-year-later-tragic-civil-right
s-moment-ignited-movement [https://perma.cc/H9VE-VPT2]; HANDSUPUNITED,
http://www.handsupunited.org [https://perma.cc/7EPU-GED9] (last visited Oct. 2,
2015).
217. See
BLM
Demands,
BLACK
LIVES
MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/blm-demands/
[https://perma.cc/88TZ-CJGB]
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2021).
218. See Paige Lavender, ‘Support Officer Darren Wilson’ GoFundMe Raises over
$137,000 for Cop Who Shot Michael Brown, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2014, 2:08
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/21/darren-wilsongofundme_n_5698013.html
[https://perma.cc/M8WG-63N2]; Julia Talanova, Support Grows for Darren Wilson,
Officer Who Shot Ferguson Teen Michael Brown, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:11 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-support/index.html
[https://perma.cc/D78C-TGCD].
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iii. Amadou Diallo
Another famous case of a controversial police shooting is that of
Amadou Diallo, who was killed by four New York City police officers
in 1999.219 Amadou was a 22-year-old West African immigrant with no
criminal record. 220 The officers, who were in unmarked cars and
dressed in street clothes, came upon Amadou as he stood unarmed at
his apartment building entrance.221 The officers testified that Amadou
was acting suspiciously and that he did not yield to their commands to
stop but instead ran inside the building when they approached. 222
Amadou was running into his own home. The officers claimed that
they began firing upon him because they thought he was reaching for a
gun.223 Amadou was unarmed and reaching for his wallet. Officers
fired 41 shots at him, and 19 of those hit him.224 All of the officers
involved in the shooting were charged with homicide then acquitted,225
leaving many confused as to how a jury truly could have found the
officers’ actions to be reasonable. Despite the officers’ claim of a
mistaken belief that Amadou was reaching for a gun, 41 shots fired for
a gun that was never seen can certainly be considered an unreasonable
response.

iv. Aaron Campbell
The January 29, 2010, police shooting of 25-year-old Aaron
Campbell in Portland, Oregon, ended in three conflicting results: (1) a
grand jury declining to indict the officers, (2) internal discipline of the
officers, and (3) a civil rights suit victory for Aaron’s family. 226 In
Aaron’s case, police were called to check on the welfare of a suicidal,

219. See Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo
Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000),

https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diall
o-shooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html [https://perma.cc/TWS8-8LW7].
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See $1.2M Settlement in Campbell Police Shooting, KGW PORTLAND (Feb. 2,
$1.2M
Settlement],
2012,
5:38
AM)
[hereinafter
https://www.kgw.com/article/news/12m-settlement-in-campbell-police-shooting/283-4
14042077 [https://perma.cc/F7HV-UCXA]; Aaron Campbell, POLICE BUREAU, CITY
PORTLAND,
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/article/538235
OF
[https://perma.cc/V878-RKGC] (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
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armed man.227 In what has become a familiar scene in these fatal police
force stories, officers claimed they believed Aaron was reaching for a
gun when Officer Ron Frashour shot him, 228 but Aaron was
unarmed.229
After declining to indict the officers, the grand jury members
released a three-page letter to the District Attorney indicating their
outrage with Officer Frashour’s actions.230 The grand jury members
wrote:
[W]e the grand jury determined that we could not indict Officer Ron
Frashour on any criminal charge. That is not to say that we found him
innocent, agreed with his decisions, or found that the police incident
at Sandy Terrace was without flaw. What we found was that Officer
Frashour’s actions were consistent with the relevant laws and statutes
regarding the use of deadly force by a police officer.231

According to the grand jurors’ letter, the police incident involved
“flawed police policies, incomplete or inappropriate training,
incomplete communication, and other issues with the police effort.”232
The grand jury understood that the law allowing an officer to kill an
individual if the officer “believed he or his fellow officers were in
imminent danger” prohibited them from indicting Officer Frashour for
killing Aaron, though they believed that “Aaron Campbell should not
have died that day.”233
The prevailing opinion amongst the grand jurors was that the officer
did not act appropriately, yet because the reasonableness standard only
focuses on the officer’s belief, the result was no criminal liability. The
internal discipline and civil award in Aaron’s case also suggests
faultiness in the traditional reasonableness approach to the use of force
by police officers. An internal investigation by the Portland Police
Department found that “it was not reasonable for Officer Frashour to
believe that Aaron Campbell posed an immediate threat of death or
serious physical injury, which is what bureau policy and training

227. See Aaron Campbell, supra note 226.
228. See id.
229. See $1.2M Settlement, supra note 226.
230. See Letter from Multnomah Cnty. Grand Jury to Michael D. Schrunk, Dist.
Att’y,
Multnomah
Cnty.
(Feb.
10,
2010),
https://www.scribd.com/document/27133490/Aaron-Campbell-Grand-Jury-Letter
[https://perma.cc/GNE3-T6AR].
231. Id. at 1.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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requires.”234 According to that investigation, “Campbell did not come
out of the apartment with a weapon drawn or in view. His hands were
clasped together on top of his head and remained there. He walked
backward toward officers and followed commands to stop, walk slowly,
and stop again.”235 All of this showed that, contrary to the grand jury
conclusion, Officer Frashour’s decision to kill Campbell was not based
on a reasonable perception of a deadly threat, but instead on the officer
being “so focused on his perception of Campbell as a threat with a gun”
that he failed to follow proper use of force protocol instituted by his
department.236 The department report relayed several alternatives to
deadly force that could have — and apparently should have — been
used by the officer in this particular situation.237
As a result of the report, Portland’s Mayor and Police Chief decided
to fire Officer Frashour and suspend three other officers involved in
the incident.238 The Mayor’s view of the incident led to the City of
Portland agreeing to pay $1.2 million to Campbell’s family to settle a
civil rights suit.239 These examples of results that are inconsistent with
the criminal cases show that — outside of the criminal context —
decision-makers find fault with the actions of police officers in these
situations.240 This disconnect with the criminal justice system reveals
the shortcomings of the traditional reasonableness standard to reflect
sentiments about what justice requires. Police force cases should be
considered as more than simply a Fourth Amendment seizure that can

234. PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU, INTERNAL INVESTIGATION: AARON MARCELL
CAMPBELL
1
(2010),
http://www.portlandonline.com/police/images/10-8352/UOFRB_report_Campbell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ELW6-ZY3U].
235. Id. at 1–2.
236. See id. at 2.
237. The report spoke of the use of a beanbag strike, as well as a K-9 option. See id.
at 2.
238. See Cop Fired, 3 Suspended for Campbell Shooting, KGW PORTLAND (Nov.
17,
2010,
5:26
AM),
https://www.kgw.com/article/news/cop-fired-3-suspended-for-campbell-shooting/28389750064 [https://perma.cc/5T6T-GQGR].
239. See Maxine Bernstein, Portland to Pay $1.2 Million to Settle Civil Rights Suit
in
Aaron
Campbell
Shooting,
OREGONIAN
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2012/02/portland_to_pay_12_million_to.html
[https://perma.cc/9GPZ-PF7B].
240. In Breonna Taylor’s case, though the grand jury did not indict any officers for
her death, her family was awarded a $12 million civil settlement from the City of
Louisville. See Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna Taylor’s Family to Receive $12 Million
Settlement from City of Louisville, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/us/breonna-taylor-settlement-louisville.html
[https://perma.cc/R6J4-ZD5A].
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be handled with the traditional, officer point-of-view-focused
reasonableness analysis. That standard fails to capture the full harm
inflicted on individuals, families, and communities when police use
extreme levels of force against individuals. This is especially true given
the racist roots of policing, the racial trauma it inflicts, and the view of
Black criminality that it perpetuates.
III. POLICING AS PUNISHMENT

The true consequences of police force — that individuals are
penalized or executed for their perceived objectionable responses to a
police encounter — demonstrate it is more akin to punishment than
seizure. Rather than an unsatisfactory reasonableness analysis, the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment death penalty analysis should
govern. The same respect for human life that fuels the protections and
guarantees given in the death penalty context can be incorporated into
the reasonableness standard that now governs excessive force claims.
A. The Eighth Amendment and Human Dignity

In interpreting the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court has expressed the importance
of human dignity241 and that “the fundamental premise of the [Cruel
and Unusual Punishment] Clause [is] that even the vilest criminal
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”242 The
Court’s treatment of the death penalty provides a strong example of
how the Supreme Court centers its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
on human dignity. In keeping with this concern, the Supreme Court
has developed several limits on when the death penalty can be imposed
through the court system. For instance, the death penalty must be
proportionate to the crime of conviction, and death cannot be a
mandatory punishment.243
Proportionality between the crime committed and the punishment
imposed is one bedrock protection that the Supreme Court has read
into the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.244 The Court deems
punishment unconstitutionally excessive if it is “grossly out of

241. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (“A punishment is ‘cruel and
unusual,’ therefore, if it does not comport with human dignity.”).
242. Id. at 273.
243. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 280–81 (1976).
244. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154.
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proportion to the severity of the crime,”245 and has described the death
penalty as “unique in its severity and irrevocability.”246 Due to this
severity, the Court has limited the death penalty to “those offenders
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”247
For this reason, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to uphold
the death penalty in situations where the defendant did not
intentionally cause the death of another human.248
The Supreme Court has also shown respect for human dignity in the
death penalty context by invalidating statutes that make death a
mandatory penalty. In the 1976 case Woodson v. North Carolina, the
Supreme Court explored the country’s history of moving away from
the mandatory imposition of such a final and severe sentence.249 The
Court quoted Chief Justice Warren Burger’s dissent in Furman v.
Georgia, 250 in which he said that the change from mandatory death
sentences “was greeted by the Court as a humanizing development.”251
As the Court elegantly stated,
process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.252

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that just punishment sees
people as individuals with value beyond their punishable actions. By
allowing each defendant to be seen as a unique individual, possibly
worthy of compassion, death penalty jurisprudence incorporates
respect for human dignity into even the most severe and final sentence.
245. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
246. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154).
247. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
248. See, e.g., id. (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when applied to
child rape); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional
when applied to adult rape).
249. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298–99 (1976) (addressing the
constitutionality of a North Carolina statute which states that certain deliberate and
premeditated murders shall be punishable by death).
250. See id. at 297 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
251. Id. at 298 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 402).
252. Id. at 304.
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The traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard misses
what the Eight Amendment captures — a concern for the human who
is subject to police violence. Unfortunately, by limiting the Eighth
Amendment to post-conviction punishment, the Supreme Court has
foreclosed a victim of police violence from the human dignity
protection that the Eight Amendment could provide.
B. Why the Eighth Amendment Should Apply to Policing

Although the Eighth Amendment purports to protect people from
cruel treatment by state actors, the Supreme Court limits the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to post-conviction
punishment. In Ingraham v. Wright,253 where parents challenged the
constitutionality of corporal punishment in schools, the Court narrowly
held that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment was inapplicable to the corporal punishment of
public school children.254
The Court’s analysis discussed the Eighth Amendment’s history,
noting that its text covers topics associated with the criminal process,
such as bails, fines, and punishment. 255 The Court reasoned that
because “the text of the Amendment suggests an intention to limit the
power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of
government,” it was not meant to apply to sanctions unrelated to the
criminal process, such as schoolchildren’s discipline.256
Unlike corporal punishment in public schools, police investigation
into criminal behavior is the starting point of the “criminal law
function” of government.257 The Supreme Court’s recognition of such
force as a Fourth Amendment seizure supports this view. A seizure
occurs when, due to police actions and the circumstances at the scene,
“a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to

253. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
254. See id. at 671. The corporal punishment in Ingraham “consisted of paddling the
recalcitrant student on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle measuring less than two
feet long, three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick” and resulted in “no
apparent physical injury to the student.” Id. at 656–57. In the subsequent case, Graham
v. Connor, the Supreme Court relied on Ingraham and concluded that the “Eighth
Amendment standard applies ‘only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.’” Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1989) (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40).
255. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
256. See id.
257. See id. (examining the Eighth Amendment’s history and recognizing it does not
apply to students punished in school settings).
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leave.” 258 The circumstances that might indicate a seizure are “the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.”259
By adopting the Ingraham view of the Eighth Amendment in police
force cases, the Supreme Court diminished its rationale that the Eighth
Amendment was inapplicable. The Ingraham Court’s observations
that corporal punishment against students is not Eighth Amendment
punishment reveals the Graham Court’s blunder in concluding that
Ingraham prohibits the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to police
force.
When a seizure occurs, it must be justified either by reasonable
suspicion (for investigatory stops) or probable cause (for seizures
amounting to the restrictiveness of an arrest). 260 The definitions of
both reasonable suspicion and probable cause indicate a required
connection between the seizure and criminal activity. Reasonable
suspicion requires an officer to have articulable facts, “which lead[] him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot.” 261 Likewise, probable cause for an arrest requires
officers to have “reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed
or was committing an offense.”262 Thus, when officers seize a person
using force — a seizure that requires some level of suspicion of criminal
activity — there is a clear connection to the criminal process, a
connection missing from corporal punishment in school.
Law enforcement officials’ use of force to carry out criminal law
investigatory power is a form of punishment. Criminal punishment is
imposed upon a person as a response to that person’s objectionable
behavior — the violation of a particular jurisdiction’s criminal statutes.
Punishment is inflicted to deter criminal behavior, rehabilitate the
criminal offender, incapacitate dangerous individuals, or express

258. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554–55 (1980).
259. Id.
260. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (“The ‘reasonable
suspicion’ necessary to justify such a stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” (quoting Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990))); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“In
conformity with the rule at common law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that
a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”).
261. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
262. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
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society’s desire for retribution against the lawbreaker.263 When law
enforcement officials seize individuals, it is because of some perceived
criminal violation committed by that individual (which may or may not
be a pretextual reason).
It is that perception of objectionable behavior — probable cause —
that legally justifies seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 264 This
means that an officer — or a magistrate in cases where a warrant is
required — must determine a “fair probability” that the individual has
committed a criminal offense before the arrest can be made.265 In the
case of Michael Brown, the alleged criminal offense was impeding
traffic. And while Officer Wilson may have initially only needed
reasonable suspicion to stop Michael from inquiring further, once
deadly force was used, Michael’s seizure was elevated to an arrest,
which would require probable cause that he had committed an
offense.266 According to Officer Wilson, when deadly force was used,
Michael’s objectionable behavior threatened Officer Wilson’s life,
which could be categorized as a host of criminal offenses — from
assault to attempted murder.267 Thus, the deadly force used against
Michael was in response to his perceived criminal behavior. In Officer
Wilson’s version of the story, lethal force was meant to deter Michael’s
life-threatening advance,268 depicting Michael as an enraged monster
untamable by any amount of negotiation. 269 The shots that took
Michael’s life were certainly meant to incapacitate him. 270 Officer
Wilson’s actions could only be justified by a belief that Michael’s
allegedly outrageously threatening behavior deserved retribution271 or

263. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAWS OF SENTENCING 17 (2d ed. 1991).
264. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152.
265. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
266. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“An arrest requires either
physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.”).
267. In his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson alleged that Michael punched him
in the face, reached into his car, repeatedly swung at him, and grabbed his gun. See
Transcript of Grand Jury, supra note 208, at 210, 212–15, 223.
268. In describing the first time he shot his gun while Michael was at his car, Officer
Wilson explained thinking, “this guy is going to kill me if he gets ahold of this gun.” Id.
at 224.
269. At one point in his grand jury testimony, Officer Wilson said that he felt “like
a five-year-old holding onto Hulk Hogan.” Id. at 212. He also described Michael as
“look[ing] like a demon.” Id. at 225.
270. Officer Wilson described his last shot against Michael this way: “And then when
it went into him, the demeanor on his face went blank, the aggression was gone, it was
gone, I mean, I knew he stopped, the threat was stopped.” Id. at 229.
271. In describing the fatal series of shots, Officer Wilson said, “I remember looking
at my sites and firing, all I see is his head and that’s what I shot.” Id. at 229.
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that rehabilitation would be futile. 272 Officer Wilson subjected
Michael to a level of force that operated in the same manner as
punishment, the same rationale evident in Breonna Taylor’s case.
Rather than initiating the mechanism of criminal justice to
rehabilitate or punish someone engaged in a drug crime by collecting
evidence, bringing charges, and duly convicting that person, the police
who entered Breonna’s home acted as though they had already
determined the guilt of everyone in that apartment.273 Officers killed
her when attempting to punish whomever fired at them, justified
because they were threatened with deadly force, despite the fact that a
person has the right to defend their home from intruders. 274 Their
shots were intended to deter and incapacitate. And the fact that even
before medical aid was rendered to Breonna, Kenneth was arrested for
shooting at officers shows that officers viewed him as worthy of
retribution. Rather than depending on a flimsy assessment of
reasonableness, courts and the public should instead view certain
aspects of policing as a form of control and punishment — especially
over Black bodies.
IV. REFORMING POLICING IS REFORMING PUNISHMENT

Viewing the use of force by police officers as a form of punishment
borrows valuable lessons from the sentencing reform movement and
theories of punishment. The goals of federal punishment are expressed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which melds utilitarian and retributivist
theories.275 This hybrid approach purports to punish offenders for a
larger societal benefit and justly penalize moral blameworthiness.276
Among the governing principles of punishment enumerated in the
statute are deterrence of specific offenders, incapacitation, crime
prevention, distribution of just punishment, and effective offender

272. Officer Wilson testified before the grand jury that as he fired a flurry of shots
at Michael, the enraged suspect “looked like he was almost bulking up to run through
the shots, like it was making him mad that I[] [was] shooting at him.” Id. at 228.
273. To understand this presumption that Black people are punishable, which denies
them their legally required presumption of innocence, see TEDx Talks,
#PresumedPunishable: Sentencing on the Streets, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moXsTCdhGQE [https://perma.cc/X2FH-H6CD].
274. See Self Defense and “Stand Your Ground,” NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/self-defense-and-stand-your-g
round.aspx#:~:text=The%20common%20law%20principle%20of,and%20expanded%
20by%20state%20legislatures [https://perma.cc/RV5G-H6GD].
275. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
276. See id.
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rehabilitation.277 Utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment
differ in their punishment goals. 278 The utilitarian theory of
punishment aims to prevent or reduce future crime, while that of
retribution is to ensure the offenders receive their “just desert.” 279
Police-initiated punishment satisfies neither the goal of crime
prevention nor the “eye for an eye” value.
While yet unfinished, inestimable work has been produced in the
sentencing reform arena that may prove instructive in reimagining the
police.280 In some circles, sentencing reform scholars have relied upon
retributive theories of punishment to urge the dismantling of the
current sentencing scheme in the United States.281 Others rely upon
deterrence,282 arguing that since it is punishment, police force should
be informed by the proportionality requirements of retributive
punishment and the crime prevention mandates of deterrence.
The utilitarian principle of deterrence is rooted in the proposition
that punishment is necessary for society’s general protection. 283
General deterrence hopes that the public crime prevention message
invoked at sentencing will remain the same throughout the sentence,
thus deterring others from committing crimes.284 Specific deterrence
posits that personalized punishment is necessary to prohibit future
crimes of the offender.285 Deterrence’s goals are not realized in any
way when punishment is police initiated.
277. See id.
278. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 1 (2008).
279. See id. at 9.
280. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE:
WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 136–39 (2006);
Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?: Embracing Uncertainty
in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 345 (2016) [hereinafter
Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?]; Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Let

My People Go: A Call for the Swift Release of Elderly Federal Prisoners in the Wake
of COVID-19, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 286 (2020); Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is
Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects on Families and Communities of
Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73, 77–78 (2014) [hereinafter
Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe]; Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling the Silver
Tsunami: Compassionate Release of Elderly Offenders, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 937 (2018)
[hereinafter Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling the Silver Tsunami].
281. See Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280;
Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe, supra note 280, at 78; Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling
the Silver Tsunami, supra note 280.
282. See Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280;
Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe, supra note 280, at 81.
283. See ROBINSON, supra note 278, at 74.
284. See Jefferson-Bullock, Quelling the Silver Tsunami, supra note 280, at 972.
285. See id.
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The concept of retribution insists that offenders be punished fairly,
based solely on the extent of their moral blameworthiness. 286
Retribution’s core justification is proportionality — that punishment
will always be proportional to desert and, therefore, fair.287 Desert falls
into two separate, yet coincidental, categories: desert pragmatism and
desert moralism.288 Desert pragmatism, or empirical desert, adopts the
“community’s shared principles of justice” in assigning liability and,
ultimately, punishment.289 Desert moralism, or deontological desert,
relies upon “abstract principles of moral right and goodness.”290 These
“bottom-up” and “top-down” theories, respectively, are intended to
work collaboratively to ensure overall justice so that “each offender
receives the punishment deserved, no more, no less.” 291 Viewing
police force as punishment begs the question of whether it was
apportioned fairly.
Proportionality is the cornerstone of retributive punishment
theory. 292 It may be viewed as a “basic right” and a “fundamental
principle of justice that emanates directly from the state’s essential
duty to protect the personal right[s] of its constituents.” 293 In the
context of criminal sentencing, proportionality requires a critical
assessment of the degree of an offender’s moral blameworthiness,
succeeded by a reckoning of whether any proposed sentence is aligned
therewith. 294 Modern egalitarian interpretations maintain that
retributive punishment must value offender and victim dignity by
determining the outer limits of punishment and constraining
punishment to the “precise amount of suffering necessary to restore a
just distribution of the burdens of the law.”295 Scholars suggest that

286. See ROBINSON, supra note 278, at 136–40.
287. Desert may be categorized thusly: vengeful desert, deontological desert, and
empirical desert. Each category apportions blameworthiness differently. Vengeful
desert considers moral blameworthiness from the point of view of the victim.
Deontological desert examines moral blameworthiness based on the views of moral
philosophers. Empirical desert distributes moral blameworthiness according to the
community’s shared justice beliefs. See id.
288. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 280, at 19.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Amit Bindal, Rethinking Theoretical Foundations of Retributive Theory
of Punishment, 51 J. INDIAN L. INST. 307, 311 (2009).
293. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 538 (2004).
294. See id.
295. Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1299–302 (2006).
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proportionality must be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively, but
its qualitative nature is more reliable.296 Just as “it is difficult to know
or control which particular details of an offender or offense inform a
decision-maker’s assessment of desert,”297 it is also nearly impossible
to measure how much punishment is enough. 298 Nevertheless,
quantitative proportionality cannot be disregarded.
A. Retribution and Quantitative Proportionality

The retributive theory of punishment is grounded in perceptions of
punishment as fair, which may include the moral philosopher’s
perceptions and those of the community. Scholars agree that desert is
only effective if the general population is convinced of its fairness and
proportionality.299 For desert to function fairly, proportionality must
be measurable — retribution requires punishment no more and no less
than what is deserved, “solely because the offender deserves it.” 300
Individual assessments are required for a punishment to survive
retribution scrutiny.
Per retributive justice theory, once an offender no longer poses a
threat to society, general deterrence considerations are no longer
justified. But the reality is that “[t]he majority of offenses do not, in
society’s opinion, merit sentences as harsh as the death penalty or even
life in prison,” and result in the imposition of “much stiffer penalties

296. See id. at 1327.
297. Id. at 1296 (“Racial bias, fear, [and] disgust . . . can shape desert assessments,
but they do so under cover of a seemingly legitimate moral judgment.”).
298. See ROBINSON, supra note 278, at 129; Jefferson-Bullock, How Much
Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280.
299. See ROBINSON, supra note 278, at 76.
Deviating from a community’s intuitions of justice can inspire resistance
and subversion among participants — juries, judges, prosecutors, and
offenders — where effective criminal justice depends upon acquiescence and
cooperation. . . . Liability and punishment rules that deviate from a
community’s shared intuitions of justice undermine that reputation.
The system’s intentional and regular deviations from desert also
undermine efficient crime control because they limit law’s access to one of
the most powerful forces for gaining compliance: social influence. The
greatest power to gain compliance with society’s rules of prescribed conduct
may lie not in the threat of official criminal sanction but rather in the
influence of the intertwined forces of social and individual moral control.
Id. at 77. In this context, proportionality is the cornerstone of fairness. Quantitative
proportionality ponders the duration of a period of punishment to determine whether
it is fair or deserved. See John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative
Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 89 (2010).
300. Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 282 (2005).
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than were originally deemed appropriate by the legislature.”301 This
rings true in the case of unreasonable police force, specifically deadly
force.
Quantitative proportionality analysis focuses on time, asking
whether the punishment is a sufficient duration. Per empirical desert,
intuitions of justice and fairness do not align with the conversion of an
encounter with police into a life sentence. Some scholars suggest that
retribution can only be accurately measured by factoring in conditions
that exist when the crime was committed.302 In this way, retribution
requires that the punishment accurately and only fits the crime.
Current policing practices and the law used to sustain them support a
quantitatively disproportionate punishment scheme. Retribution can
be better understood, however, by focusing on its qualitative elements.
An examination of Eighth Amendment proportionality is instructive
in this area.
B. Retribution, the Eighth Amendment, and
Qualitative Proportionality

The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has been interpreted to proscribe excessive or
disproportionate punishments. 303 While retribution’s definition is
well-established, considerable scholarly commentary notes the
Supreme Court’s inability to craft a concrete interpretation of Eighth
Amendment proportionality. 304 In response, some scholars suggest
that Eighth Amendment proportionality is born of retributive
proportionality and that the essential meanings of both are identical.305
Professor John Stinneford suggested that the Court’s confusion
regarding Eighth Amendment proportionality can be remedied by
looking to retributive proportionality 306 and acknowledging the
distinction between punishment’s justification and purpose. 307
Punishment’s justification “gives the punishment the quality of justice”
301. Michele Westhoff, An Examination of Prisoners’ Constitutional Right to
Healthcare: Theory and Practice, 20 HEALTH LAW. 3, 10 (2008).
302. See Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280, at

390.
303. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
304. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 904–06 (2011).
305. See id. at 965. According to Professor John Stinneford, “[t]he historical
evidence demonstrates that the focus of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause .
. . was retributive rather than utilitarian.” Id.
306. See id. at 967.
307. See id. at 962.
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or “ensures that the offender gets his due.”308 At the same time, its
purposes “are the good things we hope to achieve through it, without
respect to what is due to the offender as a matter of justice.”309 Under
this reasoning, “a punishment is permissible only to the extent that it is
justified” but is disproportionate and, therefore, excessive if it exceeds
the “bounds of justice.”310
The assessment of whether punishment is within bounds and
appropriately proportionate should focus on the qualitative311 dignity
interests inherent in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Dignity
interests speak directly to the type of punishment imposed — in other
words, the qualitative character from the punishment.312
When an offender is incarcerated after being adjudged guilty,
qualitative proportionality review does not focus on time served but
seeks to identify whether inmates’ experiences of confinement are
proportional to “the crime committed, the culpability of the offender,
or both.”313 Qualitative proportionality, then, pertains to the means
and conditions of punishment and does not contemplate the duration,
but the manner in which one is punished. 314 A requirement that
conditions of punishment must not offend human dignity315 limits the
government’s power to punish.316
Certainly, police brutality offends human dignity:
Police use of force should include base levels of verbal and physical
restraint, non-lethal force, and lethal force; yet, instead, they are
permitted and trained to use deadly or lethal force, including shooting
and chokeholds, under said “justifiable” circumstances. Moreover,
regardless of the official or unofficial restrictions and controversies
on the use of lethal force, a police officer might and, often times does,
violate those limitations. To this day, there are no methods to
objectively control police brutality.317

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Scholars suggest that Eighth Amendment proportionality analyses disallow
examination of the quantity of punishment, and instead courts must appraise only its
qualitative value. See generally id. at 968–72.
312. See Castiglione, supra note 299, at 107–08.
313. Id. at 79.
314. See id.
315. Proportionality demands that punishments are not “violative of [the] inherent
dignity [of] human beings.” Id. at 99–100.
316. See Dubber, supra note 293, at 538.
317. Crusto, supra note 24, at 11–12 (footnotes omitted).
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The consequence is qualitatively disproportionate punishment, which
includes being “[h]andcuffed and pinned on [your] stomach by three
police officers in a chokehold for nearly nine minutes” while crying out
for your mother and attempting, in vain, to tell officers that you cannot
breathe; being fatally shot while “[r]unning away from the police after
a peaceful interrogation”; and being awakened after midnight by a
police battering ram, shot indiscriminately, and denied immediate
medical aid.318 Such brutality is often inflicted upon people — like
George Floyd and countless others 319 — publicly, augmenting the
indignity. In the case of deadly force, police action is a “violent public
spectacle of official homicide.” 320 Police-inflicted punishment is
degrading, destructive of dignity, and in violation of theories of
retribution and Eighth Amendment qualitative proportionality.
C. Deterrence and Meaningfulness

Deterrence has long been criticized as a punishment tool because it
lacks meaningfulness if its ultimate goal is crime prevention. 321
Deterrence-based sentences are premised on the notion that “criminal
law formulations can influence conduct ‘on the street.’”322 However, if
a potential offender cannot appreciate that his criminal conduct may
be detected and that punishment will be severe or is not even aware of
the punishment associated with his conduct, the punishment’s expected
deterrent effect is lost.
Professor Paul H. Robinson’s work criticizes deterrence as a
principle for distributing punishment and focuses on the misguided
efforts of legislative drafters to prevent crime by creating laws
supported solely by deterrence.323 He suggested that deterrence-based
punishment is grounded in three unpersuasive assumptions: (1) that
criminal offenders know the law, (2) that criminal offenders “perceive
the cost of violation [of the law] as greater than the perceived benefit,”
and (3) that criminal offenders “bring such knowledge to bear on

318. See id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).
319. See Shawn Hubler & Julie Bosman, A Crisis That Began with an Image of
Police Violence Keeps Providing More, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/police-violence-george-floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/WM5U-FEVZ].
320. Crusto, supra note 24, at 58.
321. See ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 280, at 136.
322. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J.
949, 969 (2003).
323. See id. at 953.
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[their] conduct decision at the time of the offense.”324 All three of
these assumptions are erroneous because “most people do not know
the law,” and even if they do, “a host of conditions . . . interfere with
the rational calculation of self-interest by potential offenders.”325
The false premise of deterrence extends to judges, who share the
same delusion that their sentencing decisions deter criminal behavior
and police-initiated punishment. When police, rather than the law,
punish people who have not yet been charged with a crime, the
response is not crime prevention, but outrage.326 As in other instances,
this type of punishment carries no deterrent effect, and, therefore,
lacks genuine meaningfulness. Though sentencing reform is imperfect,
the goals and approaches of recent sentencing reform efforts are
instructive to police reform, and ultimately make a case for police
defunding.
V. SENTENCING REFORM EFFORTS

Punishment has undergone drastic transformations since the
founding of the Union. 327 Under colonial rule, beliefs in man’s
inherent depravity led to swift, harsh punishment. 328 After the
Revolutionary War, scholars and theologians boasted of humans’
redeemable qualities, and punishment began to shift towards a more
rehabilitative scheme. 329 By the late 1800s, however, the nearexclusive purpose of punishment was rehabilitation with retribution
and deterrence playing only incidental roles.330
A. Judicial Discretion and Sentencing

In the 1960s, rehabilitation came under great scrutiny, and
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, leaders questioned its efficacy.331 As
a result, Congress initiated an extensive investigation into the state of
324. Id.
325. Id. at 954–55.
326. See George Floyd: Videos of Police Brutality During Protests Shock U.S., BBC
NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52932611
[https://perma.cc/L9R3-7DHG]; Justin Carissimo, Police Fatally Shoot Black Teen
Sparking Protests in Waukegan, Illinois, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2020, 10:53 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/waukegan-shooting-marcellis-stinnette-black-teen-po
lice-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/6VR2-2HGN].
327. See Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe, supra note 280, at 78.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.; see also United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (11th Cir.
1989).
331. See Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1207–08.
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federal sentencing, ultimately concluding that “[w]e know too little
about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a
particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.” 332 In the name of
sentencing reform, leaders rebelled against judges’ unfettered
discretion in sentencing, decrying that judges administered sentences
arbitrarily and inconsistently, often for identical offenses.333 Shunning
rehabilitation models, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
endorsed retribution and deterrence as the principal purposes of
federal punishment.334 Its sentencing provisions were included in the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), which convey that the “primary focus
of sentencing attention was no longer the offender, but rather the
offense.”335
The SRA transformed the country’s punishment model from
rehabilitative to retributive and deterrent.336 It stripped judges of the
sentencing authority they had exercised for years,337 tying their hands
to lengthy, determinate mandatory minimum sentencing, diluting their
ability to consider offenders’ unique circumstances. Realizing that
judges were perhaps too constricted, the Supreme Court declared
mandatory minimums advisory. 338 Rendering mandatory minimum
sentences advisory in later years, however, did little to empower
sentencing judges to reduce the imposition of excessively lengthy
mandatory minimum criminal sentences.339
Guidelines formulation and application represent biased responses
to the widely accepted problem of unfairness and inconsistency in

332. Id. at 1207.
333. See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1027
(1991).
334. See Scroggins, 880 F.2d at 1208.
335. Sandra Shane-Dubow, Introduction to Models of Sentencing Reform in the
United States, 20 LAW & POL’Y 231, 236 (1998). Indeed, the SRA’s senate report
described the existing state of punishment as “based largely on an outmoded
rehabilitation model.” United States. v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984)).
336. See Jordan Baker et al., A Solution to Prison Overcrowding and Recidivism:
Global Positioning System Location of Parolees and Probationers 16 (2002)
(Gemstone Program thesis, University of Maryland).
337. See id.
338. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Jelani Jefferson
Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons: A Lesson from Ohio, 42 UNIV. TOL. L. REV.
881 (2011) [hereinafter Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons];
Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe, supra note 280, at 82.
339. See Baker et al., supra note 336, at 42 (addressing the “plummet[ing]” support
of rehabilitative programs due to recidivism).
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federal sentencing.340 Since liberal and conservative sensibilities had
already abandoned rehabilitation, the necessity of its demise needed
only be gently confirmed.341 The Commissioners based the Guidelines
on the unsound psychological factor of “average current practice.”342
Today, sentencing reformers are stuck, attempting to slog through the
mess and undo decades of damage resulting from lengthy mandatory
minimum sentences.
The SRA’s sentencing scheme failed to achieve the type of
uniformity or fairness that reformers sought. Recent studies support
the conclusion that lengthier sentences directly lead to increased
recidivism rates, negatively affect efforts to rehabilitate prisoners, and
are unfairly and undeservedly issued for most, if not all, of the
examined offenses. 343 Leaders did not foresee the SRA’s legacy of
excessively long federal criminal sentences.
The Sentencing
Commission’s legacy lingers today in the form of severe mandatory
sentences, 344 limited parole opportunities, 345 and astoundingly
increased numbers of incarcerated offenders. 346 “Unfortunately, in
many respects the Guidelines are the product of crafters’ creative
imaginations and their biases.”347

340. See Francis T. Cullen, Beyond Nothing Works, 42 CRIME & JUST. 299, 326–27
(2013).
341. See id. at 327.
342. See Marvin E. Frankel, The Quest for Equality in Sentencing, 25 ISR. L. REV.
595, 604 (1991). Further, “by analysis of many thousands of cases, [the Commission]
ascertained broadly . . . the existing ranges of sentences, the recurrent factors
influencing actual sentences imposed, and the actual amounts of time served under
incarcerative sentences.” Id.
343. See Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons, supra note 338, at 882;
Vitiello, supra note 333, at 1036.
344. See Federal Mandatory Minimums, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS
(2015),
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Chart-All-Fed-MMs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KRB7-LE58] (providing a chart that shows the various statutes,
offenses, sentence lengths, and dates of enactment of federal mandatory minimums).
345. See Press Release, Just. Pol’y Inst., How to Safely Reduce Prison Population
and Support People Returning to Their Communities 1 (June 2, 2010),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_FAC_ForImmediateRelease_PS-A
C.pdf [https://perma.cc/MDX2-KBRL] (“Contributing to the total number of people
incarcerated is the reluctance of parole boards to grant parole to all people who are
eligible. Parole boards often face public scrutiny if someone they release commits a
new offense.”).
346. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-121, BUREAU OF PRISONS:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENHANCE THE TRANSPARENCY OF ANNUAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATIONS 1 (2013).
347. See Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280, at
376.
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B. Defunding: A Different View of Reform

Criminal sentencing’s punitive nature and reliance on bias are not
unique to sentencing schemes but are evident in other forms of
punishment, especially police-initiated punishment.348 Likewise, the
dangerous myth of Black criminality, which guides police use of force,
bespeaks centuries of ingrained, institutionally sanctioned
discrimination and oppression.349 Through various proposals, modernday reformers seek to overhaul the entire system by eliminating bias,
reintroducing the concept of rehabilitation, and prohibiting
unreasonably lengthy criminal sentences. 350 Whether through the
imposition of particular purpose sentencing or the inclusion of
experimentalist theory in determining how much punishment is
enough, current-day reforms pursue a total dismantling of the current
system because it is so incredibly entrenched in inequality.351
The history of police use of force is no different. Modern-day
sentencing reformers request that judges, constrained by objective,
purpose-informed sentencing goals, make more individualized and
informed sentencing decisions. These types of reforms require a
complete and total shift in how criminal processes are viewed.
Abolitionist democracy theory is instructive.
Abolitionist democracy is central to the concept of police defunding.
In contrast to traditional reform efforts, proponents of abolitionist
theory acknowledge the backdrop of oppression that is attached to
every level of every institution in the United States and assert that “the
very foundations of existing conceptions of legal justice are inadequate,
compromised, limited in the ideas of justice exhorted, and corrupted

348. See supra Part III.
349. See supra Part II.
350. See Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment Is Enough?, supra note 280.
351. See Jefferson Exum, Forget Sentencing Equality, supra note 25. Despite the
name of the article, the Author’s argument was not against racial equality in
sentencing. Instead, the article recognized that calling for racial equality in sentencing,
particularly in the cocaine sentencing context, will not necessarily result in better
sentencing. See id. at 130–43. Instead, if racial inequality in drug sentencing was
remedied by sentencing the overwhelmingly Black crack cocaine defendants to the
same sentences as powder cocaine defendants, the system would simply be left with
cocaine defendants of all races getting a sentence that is not serving any purpose of
sentencing and is contributing to ineffective mass incarceration. See id. at 122–30. This
is because current cocaine sentencing does not deter drug offenses, rehabilitate
offenders, or incarcerate only dangerous defendants, nor does it adequately reflect
community sensibilities of just deserts or retribution. See id.
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by inescapably vicious and inegalitarian institutional histories and
cultures.”352
Per abolitionist democracy theory, reform of any systemically racist
system requires disruption of racist narratives.353 The theory “calls for
a constellation of democratic institutions and practices to displace
policing and imprisonment while working to realize more equitable
and fair conditions of collective life.”354
[T]he abolition of slavery was accomplished only in the negative
sense. In order to achieve the comprehensive abolition of slavery —
after the institution was rendered illegal and black people were
released from their chains — new institutions should have been
created to incorporate black people into the social order . . . .355

In the area of prison reform, abolitionist democracy efforts consist of
“embrac[ing] both a negative or deconstructive project of dismantling
penal systems and a positive project of world-building.”356 Such work
involves “the creation of an array of social institutions that would begin
to solve the social problems that set people on the track to prison,
thereby helping to render the prison obsolete.”357
Akin to police defunding, abolitionist theory requires “a
democratically informed effort to target the causes of interpersonal
harm while ensuring peace and well-being, as well as the displacement
of policing and imprisonment in connection with efforts to realize
greater social and economic equality.”358 For each, the overarching
goal is to overhaul unjust resource allocations, and “build local
democratic power to reinvest public resources in projects that actually
provide meaningful security, while simultaneously reducing the violent
theft perpetrated daily by mainstream economic practices and
institutions.”359
Similar to discussions regarding sentencing reform, abolitionist
democracy theory provides a framework that urges a complete
overhaul of current police practices. In drawing from instances where
352. Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1637 (2019).
353. See id. at 1616.
354. Id. at 1618. Professor Allegra McLeod wrote: “Abolitionist organizers
understand their work to be related to the historical struggles against slavery and its
afterlives, against imperialism and its legacies,” with the ultimate goal of “eliminat[ing]
oppressive institutions and creat[ing] new forms of more just coexistence.” Id. at 1617.
355. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ABOLITION DEMOCRACY 95 (2005).
356. Id.
357. DAVIS, supra note 355, at 96.
358. Id. at 1619–20.
359. Id. at 1633.
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the government declined to prosecute or juries neglected to convict
officers for brutalizing people, abolitionists claim that even convictions
would ultimately fail to produce equitable outcomes because they
would neglect to change the “institutional and cultural dynamics
responsible for the pervasive violence of policing.”360 In such cases, the
problem is not that deserving, “isolated ‘bad apple[s]’” 361 have not
been appropriately punished, but that policing methods, systems, and
processes that permit brutality as a regular occurrence remain intact.
They continue to operate against “the backdrop of a status quo”362 that
is steeped in racism and inequality. 363 In the case of policing,
abolitionist democracy theorists urge a complete reimagining of police
functioning and practice. This model is critical in attempting to view
punishment differently, such that genuine rebuilding can be realized.364
CONCLUSION: ANTIRACIST SENTENCING REFORM INCLUDES
DEFUNDING THE POLICE

This unique moment, when there is increased public interest in being
antiracist –– “a radical choice in the face of this history, requiring a
radical reorientation of our consciousness” 365 –– presents an
opportunity for reform. The face of U.S. history is fraught with using
police force to control, oppress, and traumatize Black Americans.366
Still today, police force is imposed in racially discriminatory ways that
display the incidences and badges of policing’s roots in slavery, and the
police funding model supports and institutionalizes this racism.367
Defunding the police answers the antiracist call to radically reorient
the public consciousness and faith in the entire criminal justice system,
which has been undermined by the routine use of force against Black
Americans. Legal standards for challenging the excessiveness of police
force based on reasonableness reap unreasonable outcomes that reflect
biased views of Black criminality. Reconceptualizing these aspects of
policing as punishment situates the defund movement within the
360. Id. at 1639.
361. Id. (quoting Mariame Kaba, Police “Reforms” You Should Always Oppose,
TRUTHOUT
(Dec.
7,
2014),
https://truthout.org/articles/police-reforms-you-should-always-oppose/
[https://perma.cc/B7YE-B6YE]) (alteration in original).
362. Id. at 1640.
363. See supra Section I.A.
364. See generally McLeod, supra note 352.
365. KENDI, supra note 6, at 23.
366. See HUBERT WILLIAMS & PATRICK V. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING STRATEGY OF
POLICE: A MINORITY VIEW (1990); Hasbrouck, supra note 32.
367. See Hasbrouck, supra note 32, at 216–19.
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widely accepted sentencing reform movement and reorients policing as
punishment outside of the protections of the criminal process. This
reorientation recognizes that police-initiated punishment fails to fulfill
the legitimate purposes of criminal punishment and is, therefore, in
need of an entire overhaul.
True systemic change can only happen in conjunction with
eradicating racism. The movement to defund the police is “a call to
reinvent our criminal justice system to better honor our national pledge
of equal justice under the law.”368 We can do this by calling policing
what it is: punishment. We will no longer stand for a racist system of
sentencing son the streets or in the courts.

368. Hostetler & Gammage, supra note 13, at 27.

